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# From Fracture to Capture

*Colonial Amnesia, Redirected Grievance, Buffer Elites, and the Multi-Front Erosion of African Sovereignty*

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## Abstract

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This article argues that many contemporary African crises should not be read as isolated failures of governance, ethnicity, migration management, or peacebuilding. They are better understood as recurrent expressions of a broader anti-sovereignty mechanism in which colonial injury is softened or selectively remembered, legitimate grievance is redirected inward, local relay actors police acceptable diagnosis, and external powers or aligned interests regain leverage over fractured political space. The article develops a mid-range mechanism theory called the Fracture-Buffer-Capture model and applies it through a comparative historical analysis of South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo. South Africa is treated as a paradigmatic case of redirected grievance under conditions of selective reconciliation, durable inequality, and recurring xenophobic mobilization. The DRC is treated as a paradigmatic case of capture under conditions of proxy war, strategic mineral competition, peace-coded political discipline, and civic narrowing. The core claim is not that every conflict is centrally engineered by the same hands. It is that similar actor-types, discursive moves, incentive structures, and political outcomes recur often enough to justify a unified framework and a continental anti-capture response. The article adopts an assume-compromise, zero-trust perspective: hostile shaping, fragmentation, and strategic interference are treated as standing risk conditions to be assessed through motive, capability, precedent, synchronized indicators, and patterned benefit rather than through self-reporting by the actors involved. The article concludes that Africa requires a Pan-African anti-capture architecture able to defend historical clarity, detect redirected grievance, map buffer actors, correlate conflict with extractive and diplomatic pressures, and train public pattern recognition before crisis hardens into governable fracture. [1-4]

A superficial reading would interpret the assume-compromise posture as making external parties the architects of every situation described here. This reading is inaccurate: a hostile party does not need to initiate every single disruption. It suffices that they engineer and sustain a system that will be more likely to promote capture and manageable chaos where opportunistic intervention and targeted incitement are less costly for the hostile party and locally aligned interest groups than successful redress by the target society.



## 1. Introduction

Across the African continent, crises that are usually narrated as separate events often display a deeper strategic continuity. Xenophobic violence, anti-dissent repression, proxy war, selective transitional justice, anti-migrant mobilization, historical euphemization, and externally mediated extraction do not merely coexist. They frequently unfold as connected moments within a wider struggle over sovereignty, memory, and political direction. South Africa's recurrent anti-African violence since 1994, especially the major waves of 2008, 2015, and 2019, shows how unresolved structural inequality can be redirected toward proximate African targets rather than toward the deeper apartheid-colonial settlement. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the coexistence of regional armed predation, mineral competition, peace language, and the narrowing of civic space shows a related structure in which sovereignty is weakened not only by force, but also by the controlled management of diagnosis, legitimacy, and dissent. [1, 4, 6-8, 10, 12]

This article argues that such crises should not be treated primarily as isolated breakdowns of governance or morality. They should be analyzed as recurrent expressions of an anti-sovereignty mechanism in which historical violence is softened or selectively remembered, legitimate

grievance is redirected inward, local relay actors discipline political interpretation, and external powers or aligned interests regain room to arbitrate, extract, or stabilize on favorable terms. The central thesis does not aim to establish that every episode is directed by the same visible hands, nor that all internal violence is externally scripted. It however shows that similar actor-types, similar discursive moves, similar incentive structures, and similar political outcomes recur often enough to justify a unified framework. This article therefore treats hostile shaping, strategic fragmentation, and externally beneficial disorder as standing risk conditions to be assessed through patterned indicators rather than presumed absent until openly confessed by actors whose very mandate and success rely on plausible deniability.

**The first problem** is conceptual. Existing literature often treats xenophobia, tribalism, transitional justice, authoritarian narrative control, extractive political economy, and external intervention as distinct domains. In many captured postcolonial settings, xenophobic and tribalized hostility are not wholly separate disorders, but recurrent secondary codings of a deeper colonial hierarchy logic. Where explicit color ranking becomes less speakable, the same ordering logic is often displaced into ethnicity, nationality, region, migration status, language, or cultural legitimacy. Yet the lived reality of many African states suggests a tighter articulation. Where

colonial injury remains undernamed, justice remains partial, and reconciliation is moralized without adequate repair, the field of grievance becomes unstable. Anger seeks an outlet. Under such conditions, nearby groups such as migrants, dissenters, minorities, or regional rivals are often made to carry the burden of a crisis whose deeper causes lie elsewhere. South African evidence is particularly clear on this point. Xenowatch has documented hundreds of incidents of xenophobic violence and discrimination across the democratic period, showing that such violence is not an episodic anomaly but a durable pattern with recognizable triggers, permissive conditions, and recurrent targets. [4, 12]

**The second problem** is psycho-historical. Colonial systems did not merely conquer. They classified, ranked, hardened difference, favored intermediaries, normalized asymmetrical memory, and governed through fractured social fields. Comparative research on colonial policy shows that postcolonial ethnic conflict becomes more likely where colonial rule politically favored some groups over others, thereby transforming social difference into administratively reinforced competition. This clarifies why postcolonial fracture is rarely a simple failure of national maturity. It often represents the afterlife of an engineered structure. When that structure is later denied, softened, or wrapped in a language of premature harmony, pattern recognition itself becomes harder. Colonial amnesia therefore does not only

protect former beneficiaries. It also disorients the injured, making structural causes appear accidental, spontaneous, or self-generated. [3, 9]

**The third problem** is political. Many captured or semi-captured states do not suppress resistance only through direct coercion. They also narrow the range of legitimate interpretation. Critics of the regime, of externally aligned arrangements, or of peace processes that leave predation intact are recoded as extremists, spoilers, ethnonationalists, or enemies of peace. In eastern Congo, recent reporting on the military trial of peaceful protesters illustrates the severity of this danger. In such settings, the state does not merely regulate behavior. It regulates diagnosis. It determines which external actors may be criticized safely, which histories may be spoken fully, and which categories of suffering must remain subordinated to the rhetoric of order. This article names that condition *epistemological capture*. [1, 2]

The argument proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the literature on colonial governance, colonial amnesia, redirected grievance, narrative policing, and extractive political economy. The third section defines the paper's key concepts. The fourth presents the Fracture-Buffer-Capture model. The fifth explains the methodology and its zero-trust posture. The sixth and seventh sections analyze South Africa and the DRC. The eighth section synthesizes the

cases. The ninth proposes a Pan-African anti-capture architecture.

## 2. Literature Review

The literature relevant to this analysis sits in five adjacent fields that are rarely integrated with sufficient precision. One field examines colonial governance and the long afterlife of divide-and-rule. A second studies memory, amnesia, and transitional justice. A third analyzes xenophobia, scapegoating, and lateral violence. A fourth addresses authoritarian discourse, narrative policing, and the securitization of dissent. A fifth explores dependency, strategic extraction, and the political uses of instability. Taken separately, each field explains part of the problem. Together, they reveal a recurring mechanism through which historical injury is denied or softened, grievance is redirected, and fractured political space becomes easier to manage from above or from outside.

**The colonial governance** literature provides the first anchor. Its strongest insight is beyond the simple claim that colonialism divided societies. The more precise finding is that some colonial policies transformed social difference into politically explosive competition by favoring certain communities over others and embedding those asymmetries in administration, representation, and access to power. Lange, Amasyali, and Jeong sharpen this point by arguing that communalizing colonial policies become especially dangerous when they explicitly privilege some communities over others,

especially in matters linked to political power. [3]

That literature also helps correct a persistent weakness in postcolonial commentary. Too many accounts treat ethnic or communal violence as if it were the spontaneous resurfacing of ancient hatred. The better scholarship rejects that laziness. Colonial states did not simply encounter fixed identities. They classified, hardened, ranked, and governed through them. The result was not merely administrative order but a political field in which some groups learned to see state access, security, and survival through the language of competitive communal entitlement. This article builds on that insight, but extends it into the politics of memory and diagnosis. [3]

**The Congolese colonial record** supports the same mechanism from another angle. [18, 21] The Belgian order did not rely only on direct domination. It also elevated intermediary strata whose recognition and advancement depended on conformity, administrative usefulness, and distance from politically troublesome or insufficiently compliant Africans.

**The second field** concerns colonial amnesia and the politics of memory. Here the central issue is not merely whether colonial violence happened, but how it is later narrated, softened, or displaced. Recent work on colonial amnesia argues that the suppression or dilution of colonial history is itself a contemporary political act. It does not merely protect the reputations of former empires. It also weakens the analytical capacity of the

formerly colonized by obscuring the historical architecture of current inequality and conflict. Once founding violence is muted, present suffering appears self-generated, accidental, or cultural. [9]

This **memory literature** is especially useful when paired with debates on transitional justice. [9] Reconciliation can serve a necessary ethical and political role. Yet the literature also shows that reconciliation discourses can become distorted when they outrun truth, prosecution, material repair, or institutional restructuring. Under those conditions, peace ceases to be a just settlement and becomes a disciplining language. Victims are urged to move on. Structural beneficiaries remain insufficiently named. Critique is recoded as divisive, irresponsible, or extremist.

**The third field** is the literature on xenophobia, anti-migrant violence, and scapegoating. South Africa offers the clearest empirical base for this discussion. Xenowatch's long-run dataset shows that xenophobic violence in democratic South Africa is neither anecdotal nor episodic. Its factsheet records 796 incidents between 1994 and April 2021, producing at least 588 deaths and large-scale displacement, while its broader report documents 873 incidents between 2008 and November 2021. These numbers matter because they establish recurrence, not exception. [4, 12]

The explanatory literature around these South African cases emphasizes

weak local governance, poor conflict resolution, poverty, unemployment, competition in informal markets, selective policing, and rhetoric that casts migrants as threats to jobs, services, and safety. This body of work is indispensable, but it often remains too close to the immediate event field. It explains why violence erupts. It does not always explain why deeper structural rage is repeatedly attached to proximate African targets rather than to the governing settlement itself. [4, 5, 10, 12]

**The fourth field** concerns authoritarian discourse and the policing of dissent. Human Rights Watch's 2026 reporting on the DRC describes worsening abuses amid fighting involving the Rwandan-backed M23 and other armed groups, while a separate April 2026 report documents peaceful protesters facing military trial. These are not merely human-rights incidents in isolation. They show how civic space can shrink precisely when the language of peace, emergency, and security becomes more politically central. [1, 2]

**The fifth field** concerns dependency, extraction, and the strategic uses of instability. Reuters reported in April 2026 that U.S. companies were eyeing Congolese mining assets including Rubaya, and that the DRC had provided Washington with a list of high-priority assets as part of a strategic minerals partnership. The next day Reuters reported concerns about a key U.S. firm's overstated mining experience. These

reports do not prove a unified conspiracy. They do show that conflict, diplomacy, and strategic resource interest can operate on the same terrain at the same time. [6-8]

**A related literature** on Black political repression in the United States adds an important comparative warning. The relevance of COINTELPRO is not that it provides documented historical evidence that powerful state systems have deliberately sought to prevent Black coalition-building and the emergence of unifying leadership. [11]

**The South African historical record** reinforces the same warning from another direction: fragmentation can be cultivated not only through direct repression, but through turned fighters, vigilante auxiliaries, and the recoding of state-managed violence as spontaneous communal conflict. [13-15]

**What is missing from the literature** as a whole is integrative. Colonial governance scholarship explains structured fracture. Memory scholarship explains historical softening. Xenophobia research explains localized violence. Rights reporting documents civic narrowing. Political economy literature tracks extraction and dependence. Yet these strands are rarely assembled into a single mechanism that can account for why unresolved historical injury so often produces lateral violence, why buffer actors become central, and why external leverage tends to reappear most effectively when internal solidarity is weakest.

### 3. Conceptual Framework

This article turns on a small set of concepts that must be defined with care before they are put to work. The terms used here identify distinct parts of a mechanism.

**Redirected grievance** refers to a process in which anger generated by durable structural harm is displaced from its deeper beneficiaries toward safer, more proximate, or more vulnerable targets. Those targets may be migrants, minorities, political dissidents, regional rivals, or socially stigmatized outsiders. The concept is narrower than general scapegoating. It implies that grievance has an original object rooted in historical or institutional reality, but that public discourse, elite mediation, or social fear reroutes that grievance away from the harder target and toward a more available one. South Africa's long record of anti-immigrant violence is especially important here because it shows recurring attacks against African migrants under conditions of persistent inequality, weak accountability, and political rhetoric that frames outsiders as the source of local suffering. [4, 5, 10, 12]

**Epistemological capture** refers to a condition in which the boundaries of legitimate public truth are narrowed so that some forms of violence, dependency, and historical responsibility become difficult to name fully, while other forms of threat are amplified and made hyper-visible. It does not require total censorship. It operates by sorting the sayable from the unsayable, the

responsible from the inflammatory, and the realistic from the supposedly extreme. Recent writing on colonial amnesia is useful here because it shows that historical erasure is itself a form of epistemic violence. This article extends that insight from memory to statecraft. [9]

In the case analyses below, the term is used as an interpretive framework for observed restrictions on public diagnosis, not as a claim that all actors within the field operate with identical intent.

**This wider logic of managed perception** overlaps with recent work on harm-preserving legitimacy, moral inversion, and institutional gaslighting, where domination survives not only by force but by reorganizing what can be safely named, doubted, or condemned. [18]

**Buffer elites** are local actors who absorb social pressure, translate structural violence into administratively acceptable language, and discipline the field of interpretation in ways that protect the deeper arrangement. They may be politicians, security managers, media figures, donor-facing technocrats, civil-society brokers, regional intermediaries, religious authorities, or commercial actors. What unites them is not ideology but function: they stabilize a deeper arrangement by absorbing, redirecting, moralizing, or containing structural grievance.

**Colonial intermediary strata** such as administratively favored évolué formations illustrate an earlier version of

this logic, where legibility to power, distance from unruly solidarity, and usefulness in managing the colonized field could become routes to status and protection.

**Colonial amnesia** refers to the active suppression, euphemization, fragmentation, or moral neutralization or romanticization of colonial violence and its enduring consequences. More than simple forgetting, it is a political arrangement of memory. Colonial amnesia protects former imperial reputations, but it also disables pattern recognition among the formerly colonized by separating present disorder from the historical structures that produced it. [9]

**Selective reconciliation** names a political asymmetry in which peace becomes a one-sided ethical burden. Under such conditions, victims are urged toward maturity and closure while the beneficiaries of foundational violence remain materially protected or symbolically rehabilitated. Once that burden hardens, legitimate grievance is easily pathologized as dangerous anger or hostility to peace.

**Colonized fascism** names a dependent coercive order in which hierarchy, repression, discipline, and the policing of dissent operate inside a state that remains structurally aligned with, penetrated by, or deferential to external strategic interests. The term does not collapse all postcolonial authoritarianisms into classical European fascism. It identifies a recurring inversion:

the state may become harsher toward internal critics than toward durable external harms.

**External advantage** refers to the political, military, diplomatic, financial, or extractive leverage gained by outside powers, firms, aligned states, or transnational systems when a society has entered a condition of governable fracture. The key point is that external actors do not need to have caused every stage of the crisis directly in order to benefit from it. The recent overlap in the DRC between conflict, mineral diplomacy, and U.S. commercial interest around Rubaya illustrates the kind of terrain this concept addresses. [6-8]

These concepts are related, but they are not interchangeable. Colonial amnesia describes the management of memory. Epistemological capture describes the narrowing of legitimate diagnosis.

Redirected grievance describes the rerouting of anger. Buffer elites describe the relay actors that stabilize that rerouting. Selective reconciliation describes the moral discipline that suppresses structural naming. Colonized fascism describes the dependent coercive order that results when internal repression serves an externally favorable arrangement. External advantage describes the leverage that accrues once fracture has become governable. This is especially important in colonized settings where aversive conduct may be directionally selective rather than broadly generalized, routed downward or inward through internalized hierarchy,

external-validation dependence, and the patterned devaluation of proximate in-group targets. [19]

#### **4. Theoretical Framework: The Fracture-Buffer-Capture Model**

The argument of this article is best expressed as a mechanism rather than as a loose analogy or a total theory of everything. The purpose of the Fracture-Buffer-Capture model is to identify a repeatable sequence through which historical injury, controlled memory, redirected grievance, and external leverage interact. It is a mid-range theory. It does not claim that all postcolonial crises are identical. It claims that a recurring structure appears across sufficiently different contexts to justify common analysis and common institutional defense.

**The model** is therefore designed for sovereignty risk assessment under uncertainty, not for retrospective proof of centralized orchestration in every case. Its purpose is to identify when patterned signs justify a shift from ordinary crisis interpretation toward high-probability inference of structured shaping, amplification, or capture.

**At its core**, the model begins from a simple proposition. A society that has undergone conquest, racialized domination, externally sustained authoritarianism, or prolonged extractive subordination does not enter the postcolonial period on neutral terrain. It inherits not only inequality and

administrative distortion, but also a damaged field of memory, legitimacy, and political expectation. Colonial policy research is useful here because it shows that long-run violence cannot be explained merely by diversity or difference. It becomes more likely when ruling structures politically favor some groups over others, converting social differentiation into organized competition over power and survival. [3]

**Stage 1** is founding injury. This refers to the establishment of a durable order of asymmetry through conquest, dispossession, racial hierarchy, strategic dependency, or enforced political subordination. Founding injury leaves material traces such as unequal land ownership, uneven citizenship, militarized borders, or externalized economic dependency. It also leaves symbolic traces. It shapes who is remembered as civilizing, who is remembered as threatening, whose suffering becomes normalized, and whose authority becomes instinctively legitimate.

**Stage 2** is narrative settlement. Once the founding injury has been institutionalized or politically inherited, the struggle shifts to memory. Historical violence is softened, euphemized, fragmented, or partially acknowledged in ways that preserve social manageability. This is where colonial amnesia and selective reconciliation become central.

Its vectors may include school curricula, public debate, media systems,

religious institutions, and digital platforms.

The order does not simply deny the past outright. More often, it moralizes closure. It asks the injured to value peace, maturity, realism, or national unity while the crime and its deeper beneficiaries remain insufficiently named. [9] This dynamic is at play both institutionally, in schools, and in the public debate. In South Africa, colonization and apartheid are vaguely ever taught or analyzed and the perpetrators are free to grieve and deny their crimes, to mock their victims and even given a protected political voice, as a “minority”. In the USA, African-Americans are regularly shamed and described as inherently less able to succeed, while COINTELPRO, war on drugs, the systematic destruction of Black Wallstreets is made invisible. In DRC, the concentration camps, systematic mistreatments, neglect, institutionalized pedocriminality and routine cannibalism, are silenced for a narrative of civilization by colonizers. In all three cases, the grievances of the colonizers are transferred downward and serve as the baseline that shape the self-perception and in-group relations. The enemy of the colonizer becomes that of the colonized. Language shows a unique signature in the variants of “the black man is the enemy of the black man” myth, where no individuation is granted in-group.

This sets the stage for a specific, pervasive form of scapegoating: redirected grievance.

**Stage 3** is redirected grievance. This is the phase in which pain generated by structural inequality, abandonment, unemployment, humiliation, or insecurity is reattached to safer internal targets. South Africa offers a powerful empirical illustration. Xenowatch records incidents of xenophobic violence in every year since 1994, including hundreds of deaths and mass displacement, which shows that the problem is not limited to episodic deviation but appears as a recurring social targeting under democratic rule. [4, 12]

Its main effect is to fracture societies and undermine unity. It often manifests itself as a response to unity, around the punishment of a leader or of a whole population.

Its contemporary vectors often include social media amplification, elite framing, reputational laundering, and selective humanitarian or security language. In such environments, structurally rooted grievance can be intensified, redirected, or moralized through synchronized messaging before it hardens into street-level enforcement or civic narrowing. News outlets, and NGOs are often mobilized for legitimacy and selective empathy theatre. Iraq, Burkina Faso, Iran, saw massively sponsored influencers, amplified through western traditional media, that used NGOs to launder western aligned terrorists, armed groups, and vilify their target. This timing reminds of how immediately after the wave of support to Captain Ibrahim Traore, algorithms coincidentally fueled

so-called diaspora wars. In the selective media amplification and framing is in the US kidnapping of president Maduro, as well as that of acts of war in the American invasion of Iran, the reporting mirrors this dynamic.

**Stage 4** is buffer enforcement. Redirected grievance does not sustain itself automatically. It requires relay actors who interpret crises, stigmatize structural critique, and normalize disciplinary language. This stage can be observed most clearly when dissent is securitized. Recent Human Rights Watch reporting on the Democratic Republic of Congo documents peaceful protesters facing military trial after organizing a demonstration over access to safe drinking water. The importance of this stage is therefore not only repression itself, but the moral recoding that accompanies repression. [2]


**Stage 5** is fracture normalization. Once redirected grievance is reinforced by buffer actors and weak accountability, exclusionary practices no longer appear extraordinary. Harassment, service denial, intimidation, looting, expulsions, selective prosecution, or vigilante enforcement become normalized possibilities. South Africa's long temporal spread of xenophobic incidents shows what normalized fracture looks like. [4, 10, 12]

**Stage 6** is external advantage. By the time this stage is reached, outside actors do not need to impose themselves on an intact sovereign field. They enter a fragmented, narratively managed, and partially securitized one. Their roles vary.

They may appear as investors, peace brokers, donors, security partners, humanitarian guarantors, or strategic suppliers. Reuters reporting from April 2026 illustrates this dynamic in the DRC, where U.S. companies were reported to be eyeing Congolese mining assets including Rubaya within the framework of a broader U.S.-DRC strategic minerals partnership. [6-8]

The article adopts an assume-compromise, zero-trust analytical posture. In contexts marked by documented histories of external interference, proxy use, strategic fragmentation, and narrative manipulation, hostile shaping is treated as a standing risk condition to be assessed through patterned indicators rather than as a claim requiring explicit admission by the actors involved. This posture does not imply a presumption of universal guilt. It is a refusal to treat historically recurrent interference, proxy use, and plausible deniability as analytically irrelevant until confession appears.

The burden of analysis is therefore not to prove innocence until confession appears, but to evaluate the probability and form of structured influence through motive, capability, precedent, synchronized signals, and strategic benefit. [3, 9, 11]



## 5. Methodology

This study uses a comparative historical design centered on mechanism tracing rather than on variable counting alone. It does not to prove a universal law of postcolonial crisis but to identify, specify, and test a recurrent causal sequence through which historical injury, managed memory, redirected grievance, buffer enforcement, and external advantage interact. The most appropriate approach is therefore a structured, focused comparison of two primary cases supported by process tracing within each case. [1, 3, 4, 9]

The study is theory-building and theory-testing at the same time. It is theory-building because the concept of epistemological capture and the full Fracture-Buffer-Capture sequence are developed here as an integrated framework. It is theory-testing because the article asks whether the predicted stages appear, whether they appear in defensible order, and whether rival explanations perform better.

In this study, high-probability inference of structured shaping does not rest on suspicion alone. It rests on convergence across five indicators:

temporal synchronization between conflict and external leverage, recurrence of comparable actor-functions across cases, narrowing of legitimate diagnosis through relay actors, asymmetric strategic benefit to specific external or buffer interests, and the failure of narrower rival explanations to account for the sequence as a whole. The argument therefore relies on patterned inference, not on claims of omnipotent orchestration.

The two full cases are South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo. They were selected through mechanism relevance rather than statistical representativeness. South Africa is a strong case for studying redirected grievance, selective reconciliation, anti-migrant violence, and the persistence of colonial-apartheid structure under formal democratic transition. The DRC is a strong case for studying proxy conflict, peace-coded political discipline, external mineral interest, repression of dissent, and the narrowing of sovereign diagnosis under conditions of strategic vulnerability. [1, 2, 4, 6-8, 12]

The article relies on a layered evidentiary base composed of event and incident documentation, comparative scholarly literature on colonial governance and memory, current geopolitical and economic reporting, historical precedent on divide-and-disrupt operations, and discursive evidence around proximate blame and securitized critique. [1-12] It also allows limited theory-guided integration of framework texts on moral

inversion, selective intragroup harm, antagonistic status ecology, and the adaptive scaling of dark patterns where these sharpen the conceptual architecture without substituting for case evidence. [18-21]

The analytic procedure unfolds in four steps. The first is periodization. The second is stage mapping. The third is actor-function analysis. The fourth is rival explanation testing. Economic scarcity, weak institutions, criminal opportunism, spontaneous hostility, and domestic elite struggle all account for part of the evidence. The question is whether they can explain the full sequence, especially the narrowing of legitimate diagnosis and the repeated conversion of structural suffering into proximate targeting.

The method has clear limits. The article does not claim direct proof of total orchestration across all cases. It does not rely on self-report by implicated actors. It relies on patterned inference drawn from motive, capability, precedent, synchronized signals, and recurring benefit. Nor does it deny local agency, opportunism, or responsibility. The model treats material hardship, weak institutions, local agency, and external interest as interacting within a structured field rather than as mutually exclusive explanations.

Despite these limits, the chosen method is the strongest fit for the argument. A statistical design would struggle to capture the control of diagnosis, the politics of memory, and the functional role of buffer actors. A purely

philosophical essay would lose empirical traction. A comparative historical mechanism study can preserve historical depth, conceptual clarity, and political specificity at the same time.

## 6. Case Study I: South Africa

South Africa is the clearest case in this article of redirected grievance becoming normalized within a formally democratic order. **The importance of the case** is not merely that xenophobic violence has occurred. Rather, such violence has recurred across decades, under changing governments, across multiple localities, and with enough continuity to be treated as structural rather than accidental. Xenowatch's public factsheet records 796 incidents of xenophobic violence between 1994 and April 2021, causing at least 588 deaths, more than 1,300 physical attacks, and over 130,000 displacements. Its broader report records 873 incidents between 2008 and November 2021. [4, 12]

The South African case is especially revealing because it combines **three features** that are often studied separately. First, it carries a powerful founding injury in the form of apartheid and its colonial prehistory. Second, it adopted a transition in which moral reconciliation became politically central while material transformation remained deeply incomplete. Third, it has repeatedly generated waves of anti-migrant violence in which foreign Africans are blamed for

jobs, crime, housing pressure, service overload, or local insecurity. Reuters' reporting on the 2015 and 2019 unrest captured this recurring frame directly. [5, 12]

**This post-apartheid pattern** did not emerge on blank social ground. The apartheid state had already cultivated suspicion, internal fragmentation, and covert proxy violence through askari networks, vigilante formations, and destabilisation campaigns that extended across South Africa and its neighbouring support environments. [13-15]

**Founding injury** appears in South Africa through the persistence of the apartheid-colonial settlement beneath a democratic constitutional surface. The idea that nothing changed after 1994 would be inaccurate. Much changed politically. The point is that deep social and economic inequalities remained durable enough to keep grievance structurally available. Xenophobic violence emerged in townships, informal economies, and stressed local service environments where social frustration was already high. [4, 5, 12]

**Narrative settlement** appears in South Africa through a moral and political order that elevated reconciliation as a national virtue while leaving many structural questions unresolved. Without denying the historical importance of reconciliation, it notes that a transition can be ethically celebrated and still remain materially incomplete. Where foundational beneficiaries are

insufficiently confronted and material repair remains limited, the public sphere may become rich in unity language but poor in structural redress. [4, 5, 12]

This **continuity** is easier to grasp once apartheid's security architecture is recalled in functional rather than nostalgic terms. Former liberation fighters were turned into askaris and used against their own comrades; vigilante formations such as Ama-Afrika became part of a wider environment in which state violence was repeatedly laundered as "black-on-black" conflict; and the broader apartheid strategy included covert destabilisation of neighbouring states that had supported the liberation struggle. These practices did not simply produce immediate repression. They also trained suspicion, normalized proxy enforcement, and deepened the psychological distance between South Africans and the wider African field. [13-15]

**Redirected grievance** is the most visible stage in South Africa. Reuters reported in 2015 that anti-immigrant attacks killed at least seven people and drove hundreds of foreigners into safety camps, while it described the 2008 wave as having killed dozens and displaced thousands. In 2019 Reuters again reported attacks on mainly foreign-owned shops, explicitly acknowledging xenophobic sentiment beneath the unrest. What matters perhaps more than the violence itself, is the regularity with which migrants become explanatory

targets for structurally rooted crises. [5, 12]

This **pattern** becomes even clearer when anti-migrant mobilization shifts from episodic riot to more organized social enforcement. AP reported in late 2025 that Operation Dudula was blocking foreigners from public health clinics in Gauteng, demanding identity documents from patients, and extending similar tactics to schools and businesses. The report also notes a Johannesburg High Court order against harassment and arrests after Dudula members entered a maternity ward and demanded documents from patients. These actions show an escalation from diffuse hostility to semi-organized policing of belonging. [10]

**The 2022 cycle** also demonstrated how contemporary incitement can move through a digital relay structure before hardening into street-level enforcement. Investigative reporting, drawing on DFRLab findings, identified the account @uLerato\_Pillay as instrumental in amplifying Afrophobic hashtags and later linked it to former SANDF soldier Sifiso Jeffrey Gwala. The later Dudula litigation is equally important for this article's mechanism: the Johannesburg High Court identified a repeated pattern of unlawful conduct, including incitement to violence and hate speech, unlawful document demands, harassment, evictions, and acts of vigilantism. This does not prove a single central command behind every episode. It does show that contemporary redirected grievance can be digitally

amplified, organizationally relayed, and then normalized through repeated local enforcement. [10, 16, 17]

**Buffer enforcement** appears in South Africa less through overt military repression than through a wider political and civic ecosystem in which migrants are repeatedly made legible as the nearest cause of public breakdown. Xenowatch emphasizes weak local governance and the susceptibility of such spaces to penetration by instigators. Reuters' coverage adds that officials have sometimes oscillated between acknowledging xenophobic sentiment and attributing unrest to criminality or local grievance. That ambiguity is politically significant. It allows the system to treat the violence as both understandable and deniable. [4, 5, 12]

**Fracture normalization** is well established in South Africa. The evidence is not made of one spectacular pogrom followed by silence but instead, by a long sequence of incidents in which targeting, displacement, looting, and intimidation remain recurrently available. Once such conduct becomes thinkable and repeatable, fracture is no longer exceptional. It becomes a live political option. [4, 10, 12]

**External advantage** appears more indirectly in South Africa than in the DRC, but it is still important. A country marked by recurring anti-African violence becomes easier to narrate externally as unstable, morally compromised, or unfit for coherent sovereign leadership. The

issue is not limited to direct investment or security deals: it includes reputational leverage. A fractured South Africa supplies symbolic fuel to paternalist narratives about Black incapacity and civilizational deficiency. [10]

**The shift** from opportunistic unrest to manufactured or semi-manufactured anti-migrant campaigns becomes more likely when multiple signaling layers align at once. One layer is digital: coordinated troll activity, repeated cross-platform talking points, or synchronized influencer messaging that frames migrants as an urgent threat. A second layer is elite-discursive: diplomatic pressure, think-piece harmonization, or repeated blue-check and elite-account amplification of the same hostile frames. **A third layer** is organizational: anti-migrant movements or on-the-ground mobs linked by personnel overlap, common slogans, repeated timing, or shared target selection. When these layers converge, the probability rises that the event is moving from spontaneous unrest or opportunistic hijacking toward something more structured.

**Historically**, the threshold for this higher-probability inference is crossed when digital amplification, organizational repetition, and a pre-existing architecture of outsider suspicion begin to reinforce one another rather than merely coexist. This is also consistent with a broader antagonistic status ecology in which grievance-centered visibility, rival

degradation, and audience reinforcement intensify escalation. [13-17, 20]

## 7. Case Study II: Democratic Republic of Congo

The Democratic Republic of Congo is the article's strongest case of **capture under conditions of armed fragmentation**, external mineral interest, and the securitization of dissent. If South Africa shows how grievance can be redirected laterally inside a democratic setting, the DRC shows how a state can remain formally sovereign while the strategic meaning of sovereignty is steadily narrowed by conflict, regional penetration, diplomatic management, and externally valuable resources. Human Rights Watch's 2026 country chapter describes widespread abuses by M23, the Congolese army, and allied militias, while Reuters reporting from April 2026 shows simultaneous U.S. commercial interest in mining assets, including Rubaya, then controlled by the Rwandan-backed M23. [1, 6-8]

**Founding injury** is unusually deep in the Congolese case. The DRC inherited a long history of extraction, externally mediated rule, militarized predation, and repeated erosion of autonomous political control. The contemporary eastern conflict sits on top of that older architecture rather than replacing it. Human Rights Watch's 2026 reporting makes clear that eastern Congo remains a zone where civilians are trapped between the M23, abusive Wazalendo militias, and

state-linked actors, confirming the persistence of a fragmented coercive order rather than a clean sovereign monopoly of force. [1]

**This deeper vulnerability** also has a colonial relay history. Belgian rule did not govern through force alone. It elevated administratively legible intermediaries, including sections of the *évolué* stratum, whose status depended on conformity, recognizability to the colonial order, and distance from politically troublesome or insufficiently compliant Africans. In functional terms, this matters because it established a durable template: local advancement could be tied to denunciation, surveillance, and the disciplining of non-conformists rather than to accountable representation. The postcolonial relay problem in Congo therefore did not begin with contemporary militias or external brokers. It inherited an older architecture in which internal buffers could be made more useful to power than solidaristic actors. [1, 18, 21]

**Narrative settlement** appears in the DRC through the repeated use of peace language as a managing frame over a field in which the underlying structures of predation remain active. Reuters reported on April 18, 2026 that the Congolese government and the Alliance Fleuve Congo rebel coalition agreed, in talks announced by the U.S. State Department, to ease travel for aid convoys and refrain from attacks on civilians. Such steps can be genuinely valuable. Yet analytically they also show how crisis is repeatedly

processed through externally announced peace gestures while deeper questions of sovereignty, territorial control, armed sponsorship, and extractive opportunity remain unresolved. [6]

**Redirected grievance** is more politically charged in the DRC because the proximate target is no longer only the foreigner or migrant. It is also the internal critic, the dissenter, the activist, or anyone whose diagnosis exceeds the approved theatre of peace and emergency management. Human Rights Watch reported on April 21, 2026 that peaceful activists in eastern Congo were arrested after organizing a demonstration calling for access to safe drinking water and were then brought before a military court. This shows how ordinary civic grievance can be recoded into a security problem once the state or its local enforcers treat unsanctioned public pressure as destabilizing. [2]

**Buffer enforcement** is sharply visible in the DRC. Here the buffer is not one single class of actor. It is an entire relay field composed of state officials, military jurisdictions, diplomatic brokers, local armed auxiliaries, and discourse managers who decide which forms of suffering may be spoken as humanitarian concern and which forms of criticism cross into prohibited territory. Buffer enforcement therefore works through fragmentation itself. Citizens face multiple coercive actors, but the range of safe diagnosis remains narrow. The result, far from clarity, is managed confusion, and

managed confusion is highly compatible with epistemological capture. Under a zero-trust reading, such managed confusion is treated as a politically useful condition. [1, 2]

**Fracture normalization** is reached when violence, displacement, extortion, militia governance, and exceptional legal treatment cease to be shocking interruptions and become recurring features of public life. Human Rights Watch's 2026 materials describe precisely such a condition in eastern Congo. When the abnormal becomes routine, sovereignty is no longer experienced as a stable protective order. It becomes selective, fragmented, or theatrical. [1, 2]

**External advantage** is clearly visible in the DRC. Reuters reported on April 20, 2026 that U.S. companies were showing significant interest in Congolese mining assets, including the Rubaya coltan mine, which was then controlled by the Rwandan-backed M23. The report also noted that the DRC had provided Washington with a list of high-priority assets as part of a strategic minerals partnership designed in part to reduce dependence on Chinese supply chains. The next day Reuters reported that Virtus Minerals, a U.S. firm central to that partnership, had overstated its mining experience. These reports matter because they show more than business interest. They show how conflict terrain, diplomatic alignment, and extractive opportunity can converge in the same political moment. [7, 8]

When peace announcements, humanitarian access language, and investment signaling intensify simultaneously without a corresponding widening of civic freedom or accountability, the probability increases that stabilization is being prioritized over sovereign repair. If peaceful domestic critics continue to be processed through military or exceptional legal channels while armed and diplomatic negotiations proceed in parallel, epistemological capture will deepen. If external diplomatic pressure, strategic minerals messaging, elite media harmonization, and local patriotic stigmatization of critics begin to align more tightly, the probability rises that dissent will be framed not merely as inconvenient but as a direct obstacle to peace and national survival. [2, 6-8]

## **8. Cross-Case Synthesis and Mechanism Comparison**

Placed side by side, South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo reveal not identical crises, but a shared mechanism expressed through different political forms. South Africa shows the lateral redirection of structurally grounded anger toward proximate African targets inside a constitutional democracy marked by extreme inequality and incomplete transformation. The DRC shows a more militarized and externally penetrated version in which civic narrowing, armed fragmentation, peace discourse, and strategic mineral interest operate simultaneously. [1, 4, 6-8, 12]

**The first major similarity** is the persistence of founding injury as a structuring condition. In South Africa, that injury is the apartheid-colonial settlement and its durable socioeconomic effects. In the DRC, it is a longer arc of extractive domination, externally mediated political weakness, and territorial vulnerability to armed and commercial penetration. In neither case does the founding injury remain confined to the past. It continues to shape who is exposed, who is blamed, and who remains partially shielded. [1, 3, 4, 12]

**The second similarity** is narrative settlement, though it takes different forms in each case. In South Africa, the key issue is a transition that morally elevated reconciliation while leaving much structural inequality intact. In the DRC, the issue is repeated peace language over a field where deeper sovereign repair remains blocked. In both cases, the effect is comparable: public discourse encourages stabilization before adequate transformation. [6, 9]

**The third similarity** is the centrality of redirected grievance. In many captured postcolonial settings, this redirection also works through recoded hierarchy: hostility that appears as xenophobic, tribal, regional, or anti-outsider often carries the deeper grammar of a colonial color order displaced into locally available markers once explicit ranking becomes less speakable.

**In South Africa**, grievance generated by poverty, unemployment, insecurity, and durable inequality is repeatedly

attached to migrants and foreign Africans. In the DRC, grievance is also displaced, though the proximate target is more often the critic or politically inconvenient speaker whose diagnosis exceeds the accepted script of peace, patriotism, or emergency discipline. In both cases, the deeper order remains harder to confront directly than the nearer target. [2, 4, 10, 12]

**The fourth similarity** is the presence of buffer enforcement. South Africa's buffers operate through weak governance, elite ambiguity, partial accountability, and the leakage of belonging-policing into pseudo-civic formations such as Operation Dudula. The DRC's buffers operate through a denser relay field of officials, military courts, militias, diplomatic managers, and patriotic framings that narrow safe diagnosis and recode civic action as destabilizing. [2, 10, 12]

**The fifth similarity** is fracture normalization. In South Africa, Xenowatch's incident counts show that anti-foreigner violence has become a recurrent social possibility rather than a singular rupture. In the DRC, Human Rights Watch's reporting shows a civic environment in which violence by multiple armed actors, exceptional handling of dissent, and the erosion of ordinary legal protection have become routine features of life in parts of the country. [1, 2, 4, 12]

**The sixth similarity** is external advantage, though the form differs

sharply. In the DRC, the convergence of conflict, diplomacy, and strategic mineral interest makes this stage unusually visible. In South Africa, the advantage is less directly extractive and more symbolic and reputational. A fractured South Africa is easier to narrate externally as proof that Black-majority sovereignty is unstable or self-undermining. [7, 8, 10]

**For pattern recognition and policy use**, the cross-case synthesis yields a practical warning sequence. The first warning sign is historical euphemization or disproportionate pressure for closure without corresponding repair. The second is the recurrent coding of nearby groups or inconvenient critics as the main source of structurally generated disorder. The third is the growth of relay actors who moralize patience, stigmatize structural naming, or extend informal policing into everyday life. The fourth is the normalization of repeated exclusionary or coercive episodes. The fifth is the appearance of intensified foreign brokerage, extractive interest, or reputational use of the fracture. [1-4, 6-12]

The comparison is therefore functional rather than symmetrical: the two cases do not share the same intensity, but they do display homologous stages within the same mechanism.

## **9. Toward a Pan-African Anti-Capture Architecture**

If the argument of this article is correct, then Africa's problem cannot be

reduced to a series of disconnected national emergencies. It must be treated as a recurring sovereignty problem expressed through different local forms. That conclusion carries an institutional consequence. The broader problem is not only who acts, but which environments repeatedly reward inversion, brokerage, selective cruelty, and the laundering of domination as order, law, realism, or community protection. [21]

A continent repeatedly exposed to managed fracture, redirected grievance, buffer enforcement, and externally profitable instability cannot rely only on after-the-fact condemnation, ad hoc diplomacy, or narrowly national diagnostics. It requires an anti-capture architecture at the Pan-African level. [1-4, 6-12]

**The first principle** of an anti-capture architecture is conceptual but immediately practical. Fracture must be treated as a strategic condition that can be cultivated, exploited, narrated, and stabilized, not merely as a spontaneous social pathology. This does not mean assuming a hidden master plot behind every disturbance. It means recognizing that repeated divisions often create predictable openings for the same categories of beneficiaries: domestic buffers, opportunistic elites, external brokers, extractive firms, security intermediaries, and reputational adversaries.

**The second principle** is that *historical clarity is not optional cultural work, but a security function.* Colonial

amnesia weakens pattern recognition because it disconnects present crises from their historical structure. An anti-capture architecture must therefore include a continental program of historical truth defense: curricula on colonial governance and divide-and-rule, public archives accessible beyond elite institutions, annual sovereignty-risk reporting that links present tensions to historical architectures, and legal or civic mechanisms to challenge official euphemization where it functions to disable diagnosis. [3, 9]

**The third principle** is operational. Anti-capture architecture must include a redirected grievance observatory able to identify early when structural anger is being reattached to proximate targets. It should track repeated blaming of migrants or minorities for structurally generated crises, the recoding of dissidents as enemies of peace, spikes in service-level exclusion, synchronized messaging across local influencers and elite accounts, and the migration of political hostility from rhetoric into informal governance. South Africa's case shows why this matters. By the time clinic blockades, school intimidation, or organized document checks emerge, the crisis is already moving beyond episodic violence toward social enforcement. [4, 10, 12]

**The fourth principle** is that sovereignty defense must track functions, not only formal titles. Because buffer enforcement operates through relay actors whose appearance changes across

settings, an anti-capture architecture must map who is performing buffer roles in each crisis. This includes political intermediaries, media amplifiers, donor-facing technocrats, pseudo-civic enforcers, legal exceptionalists, reputational laundries, and local authorities who normalize silence in the name of stability.

**The fifth principle** is crucial for cases like the DRC. Anti-capture architecture must overcome the artificial separation between conflict analysis, resource governance, and diplomatic monitoring. Reuters' April 2026 reporting on U.S. interest in Rubaya, together with concerns about a key company's credentials, illustrates why this matters. A society can be told it is entering a peace-supportive strategic partnership even as contested territory, conflict minerals, and extractive opportunity remain entangled. [6-8]

**The sixth principle** is that anti-capture architecture must defend civic sovereignty. Territorial sovereignty is fundamental, but a state whose citizens cannot criticize safely, organize independently, or name structural capture without being recoded as destabilizing is already losing sovereignty at the level of public truth. Human Rights Watch's reporting on peaceful protesters facing military trial in the DRC is instructive here. [2]

**The seventh principle** goes directly to the goal of the model. The framework must be teachable. It should train

ordinary citizens, journalists, public officials, teachers, security analysts, and regional institutions to recognize patterns before they become normalized. A usable protocol would train observers to ask, in order: what is the unresolved founding injury; how is that history being softened; which proximate targets are being blamed; which relay actors are narrowing safe diagnosis; what forms of exclusion are becoming normalized; and who is gaining leverage, legitimacy, or access as fracture deepens.

**The eighth principle** is that anti-capture architecture must not only diagnose. It must identify intervention windows. At the stage of narrative settlement, intervention should focus on public truth, memory correction, and the refusal of premature closure without structural naming. At the stage of redirected grievance, intervention should focus on counter-framing, local mediation that does not scapegoat, and emergency protection for likely proximate targets. At the stage of buffer enforcement, intervention should focus on exposing relay functions, defending civic speech, and disrupting the moralization of silence. At the stage of fracture normalization, intervention should escalate toward legal accountability, service-protection enforcement, sanctions on violent organizers, and regional monitoring. At the stage of external advantage, intervention must include transparency around deals, diplomatic pressure, conflict-resource tracing, and sovereign renegotiation mechanisms.

**A final strategic prediction** belongs here. If Africa does not build anti-capture capacity at a continental level, future crises are likely to become easier, not harder, to shape through synchronized digital amplification, reputational attack, selective diplomacy, and service-level exclusion. The same fracture can now be fueled simultaneously by trolls, respectable commentary, diplomatic cues, blue-check amplification, and on-the-ground pseudo-civic enforcement. When these layers align, the probability rises that local crisis is being shaped into a wider sovereignty event.

## 10. Conclusion

This article began from **a simple but neglected proposition**: many crises that appear separate at the level of daily politics are better understood as linked moments in a broader struggle over sovereignty. Xenophobic violence, peace-coded repression, proxy war, selective reconciliation, anti-migrant mobilization, historical euphemization, and externally profitable instability do not merely coexist. They frequently reinforce one another through a recurring sequence in which unresolved founding injury is narratively softened, grievance is redirected inward, relay actors discipline diagnosis, fracture becomes normalized, and external leverage expands. [1-12]

**The first major conclusion** is historical. Postcolonial fracture is too often misread as spontaneous internal dysfunction. The evidence reviewed here supports a more demanding

interpretation. Colonial systems did not simply leave behind inequality. They also left behind ranked memories, politically hardened differences, habits of mediation through favored intermediaries, and a damaged field of legitimacy. Comparative research on communalizing colonial policies shows that postcolonial conflict becomes especially likely when colonial rule politically privileged some communities over others. [3, 9]

**The second major conclusion** is epistemic. Colonial afterlife persists not only through material inequality or external influence, but through the management of what can be named safely. This article has called that condition epistemological capture. The concept matters because it identifies a missing link between political economy and violence. A society becomes easier to govern against its own interests when historical causation is softened, structural critique is moralized as dangerous, and proximate enemies are made more visible than entrenched arrangements. [1, 2, 4, 9, 12]

**The third major conclusion** is political. Fracture is not always the side effect of crisis. It can become a governable condition. This is why the article emphasized buffer elites and relay actors rather than relying only on named villains or generalized accusations. In both South Africa and the DRC, the mechanism depends on actors who absorb pressure, redirect or narrow grievance, and stabilize the field before it reaches the

deeper order that generated it. [1, 2, 4, 10, 12]

**The fourth major conclusion** is strategic. External actors do not need to have authored every crisis directly in order to benefit from its outcome. The argument does not require total orchestration. It requires patterned advantage. In the DRC, the convergence of conflict, diplomacy, and strategic mineral interest illustrates how fractured terrain can become easier to enter and easier to narrate as a site for stabilizing partnership. In South Africa, the external advantage is often more reputational than immediately extractive, yet still real. [6-8, 10]

**The fifth major conclusion** is methodological. The Fracture-Buffer-Capture model is strongest not when used as a slogan, but when used as a training instrument for pattern recognition. Its purpose is not only to explain why one riot, one repression episode, or one diplomatic maneuver occurred. Its purpose is to help citizens, journalists, analysts, and policymakers recognize the sequence through which societies are moved from crisis to capture. [1-4, 10-12]

**The sixth major conclusion** is institutional. If similar mechanisms recur across different African theatres, then the response cannot remain episodic, moralistic, or purely national. Africa requires a Pan-African anti-capture architecture able to defend historical clarity, monitor redirected grievance, map

buffer actors, correlate conflict with resource and diplomatic patterns, protect civic sovereignty, and train public pattern recognition before fracture hardens into structure.

**A sovereign future** will therefore depend not only on elections, investments, peace talks, or security reform taken separately. It will depend on whether African institutions and publics can learn to recognize early when peace is being used to narrow truth, when crisis is being used to recode legitimate anger, when local actors are functioning as buffers rather than protectors, and when external interest is arriving not to repair fracture but to profit from a field already softened by it. If those lessons are not institutionalized, the cycle will continue to reproduce itself under new names. If they are institutionalized, fracture may cease to be the default medium through which sovereignty is negotiated away.

**What must be neutralized**, therefore, is not disagreement itself but the relay architecture through which colonial hierarchy survives by changing its vocabulary while preserving its directional logic.

What often appears as xenophobia, tribalism, or anti-outsider sentiment is therefore not merely local prejudice in isolation, but the recurrent re-speaking of colonial hierarchy through locally available markers once explicit ranking becomes less publicly admissible.

**Table 1. Fracture-Buffer-Capture early-warning matrix**

Stage	Observable sign	Escalation signal	Intervention window
Narrative settlement	Historical euphemization; closure without repair	Critique recoded as divisive or anti-peace	Historical clarification; public truth work
Redirected grievance	Repeated blaming of migrants, minorities, or dissidents	Localized harassment; service denial; rumor cascades	Counter-framing; target protection; local mediation
Buffer enforcement	Elite ambiguity; patriotic stigmatization; pseudo-civic policing	Critics routed through exceptional language or institutions	Expose relay functions; defend civic speech
Fracture normalization	Recurring intimidation, displacement, document checks, clinic or school blockades	Violence becomes socially legible as normal	Accountability, injunctions, emergency monitoring
External advantage	Intensified brokerage, resource interest, diplomatic synchronization	Peace rhetoric and extractive opportunity converge	Transparency, renegotiation, conflict-resource tracing

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