

Colonial Narcissistic Inversion

Macron, Nairobi, and the End of African Naivety

Prepared for policy, academic, and Pan-African institutional use.

Key perspectives: psycho-historical, cognitive-diplomatic, security-strategic, predictive, legal, and elite-accountability dimensions of the Nairobi moment.

*UNIVERSITE SIMON KIMBANGU - FACULTE SCIENCES SOCIALES & POLITIQUES - DEPARTEMENT MANDOMBE,
EPISTEMOLOGIE, NEUROSCIENCES & DECOLONISATION & INNOVATION*

Prepared by K. Nsiangani, HEAD OF DEPARTEMENT

May 2026

Contents

- 1. Introduction: The Nairobi Moment Was Not a Gaffe**
 - 2. Conceptual Definition: Colonial Narcissistic Inversion**
 - 3. Psycho-Historical Lens: France Has Not Exited Empire**
 - 3A. Western Imperial Inversion: The Captor as Liberator**
 - 4. Cognitive-Diplomatic Lens: The Battle Over Meaning**
 - 5. Security-Strategic Lens: Words Prepare Access**
 - 6. The Immunity Trap: Accountability Before Trust**
 - 7. Predictive Lens: What This Signals Next**
 - 8. Elite Failure: African Intellectuals Must Grow Up**
 - 9. The False Diplomacy Class: Aggressive at Home, Servile Abroad**
 - 10. Strategic Doctrine: No Dignity, No Mandate**
 - 11. Direct Rebuttal to Macron**
 - 12. Institutional Demands and Operational Framework**
 - 13. Model Clauses and Practical Tools**
 - 14. Training Module: Dignity-Based Negotiation and Cognitive Sovereignty**
 - 15. Research and Evidence Agenda**
 - 16. Final Integrated Conclusion: From Nairobi to a New Pan-African Standard
Operational Doctrine at a Glance**
- References**

Abstract

This paper introduces the concept of Colonial Narcissistic Inversion to analyze a contemporary form of postcolonial domination in which former colonial powers appropriate the vocabulary of liberation while preserving structures of influence, access, and strategic centrality. Using contemporary examples, including Emmanuel Macron's Nairobi intervention and his reported claim that France is the 'true Pan-Africanist,' the paper argues that the incident cannot be reduced to a diplomatic gaffe, rhetorical excess, or isolated arrogance. It reveals a deeper structure in which the former colonial actor, even where its policies, security posture, or strategic interests have undermined sovereignty, attempts to reposition itself as moral author, guardian, or interpreter of the liberation tradition created against colonial domination itself. This mechanism is not limited to France. The United States has frequently used similar framing while strangling Cuba through sanctions, invading or bombing states such as Iraq and Libya, and using covert action, economic pressure, and security doctrine to limit the autonomy of states that challenge U.S. primacy. This broader pattern belongs to the Crying Demon Syndrome: the imperial posture in which a violent or predatory actor presents itself as wounded, benevolent, democratic, or morally burdened while continuing practices of domination [61].

The analysis proceeds through six connected dimensions. The psycho-historical dimension situates the incident within France's longer pattern of colonial centrality, postcolonial rebranding, and unresolved imperial psychology. The cognitive-diplomatic dimension examines how terms such as partnership, youth, reciprocity, security, and Pan-Africanism can become instruments of semantic capture when defined by external powers. The security-strategic dimension argues that symbolic language prepares material access through military cooperation, legal immunity, intelligence relationships, critical infrastructure, data systems, and financial arrangements. The predictive dimension warns that the next phase of foreign influence in Africa may operate less through overt occupation and more through youth diplomacy, innovation platforms, AI partnerships, climate finance, elite pipelines, risk-pricing reform, and the domestication of Pan-African language. The legal and elite-accountability dimensions translate the analysis into safeguards, institutional tests, and standards for judging those who claim to represent African sovereignty.

The paper further argues that African elite responses to such incidents reveal a crisis of dignity as a sovereignty indicator. Where leaders, diplomats, intellectuals, and security officials tolerate symbolic humiliation abroad while exercising harsh authority toward their own people at home, they demonstrate a dangerous asymmetry of courage. The paper therefore advances the doctrine: no dignity, no mandate; no courage, no negotiation authority; no foreign actor above African law; no reciprocity without material symmetry; no Pan-Africanism without African-defined sovereignty.

The paper also places the Nairobi moment beside two wider indicators: the March 2026 United Nations vote recognizing the trafficking of enslaved Africans and racialized chattel enslavement of Africans as the gravest crime against humanity, and the France-Kenya defence cooperation debate over visiting-force jurisdiction and military immunity [42-46]. The purpose is not to overload the Nairobi case, but to show its broader pattern: Western powers mobilize strong legal, financial, and diplomatic tools when European security is at stake, yet often become cautious, procedural, or evasive when African historical justice and African jurisdictional sovereignty are at stake [47]. Macron is further situated as a symptom of Western Imperial Inversion: a recurring Atlantic pattern in which France, Britain, and the United States convert histories of enslavement, colonial conquest, covert interference, primacy doctrine, and strategic domination into narratives of abolition, liberation, democracy, partnership, and moral guardianship [50-61].

Finally, the paper proposes an operational framework for African states and Pan-African institutions, including reciprocity audits, restrictions on blanket military immunity, jurisdictional safeguards, data sovereignty clauses, critical infrastructure reviews, foreign influence risk indexes, diplomatic training modules, conceptual sovereignty archives, elite accountability scorecards, and annual sovereignty audits. The central conclusion is that outrage must become doctrine, doctrine must become tools, tools must become institutions, and institutions must become power.

Keywords: Colonial Narcissistic Inversion; Crying Demon Syndrome; Pan-Africanism; France-Africa relations; cognitive sovereignty; material reciprocity; military immunity; elite capture; Françafrique; security cooperation; reparatory justice; false diplomacy; coercive relevance; Western Imperial Inversion; imperial psychology; covert action; abolition memory.

1. Introduction: The Nairobi Moment Was Not a Gaffe

The Nairobi moment must be named without softness. When Emmanuel Macron claims that France is the 'true Pan-Africanist,' describes Africa through the frame of youth, and interrupts an African setting to demand silence, he is not merely committing a diplomatic error. He is performing authority. He is testing the limits of African tolerance. He is showing what France still believes it can do in African political space when the room is trained to confuse foreign arrogance with diplomatic prestige.

The Africa Forward Summit was co-hosted by Kenya and France in Nairobi on 11-12 May 2026 and was officially framed as an Africa-France partnership platform for innovation and growth [1, 2]. Reuters described the event around financial reform, risk pricing, and investment access for African countries [3]. AP and Le Monde situated it in the wider context of France's effort to recover influence after military and political setbacks in parts of Africa, including the erosion of old Françafrique legitimacy and the pivot toward Anglophone Africa [4, 5]. This context matters because the statement was not made in a neutral room. It emerged precisely when France was trying to re-narrate its African role.

The same period also revealed a wider double standard in global moral urgency. On 25 March 2026, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration of the Trafficking of Enslaved Africans and Racialized Chattel Enslavement of Africans as the Gravest Crime against Humanity by 123 votes in favour, 3 against, and 52 abstentions [42]. Reporting and explanations of vote recorded that the United States, Israel, and Argentina voted against, while the European Union and the United Kingdom abstained or expressed legal reservations around hierarchy, selectivity, reparatory implications, and non-retroactivity [43-45]. The point is not that

every abstention has the same motive. The point is that African historical justice still meets procedural caution precisely where European security crises often trigger rapid sanctions, institutional pressure, and moral mobilization [47].

The insult is therefore not only in the words but in the structure. Macron claims the vocabulary of Pan-Africanism while France remains historically associated with the very systems Pan-Africanism was created to resist: slavery, colonial domination, racial hierarchy, military interference, economic dependency, cultural humiliation, and the long postcolonial machinery of Françafrique. The contradiction is frontal. France cannot credibly claim to embody Pan-Africanism while treating African sovereignty as acceptable only when it remains compatible with French strategic interests.

This is not merely a French problem or a Macron problem, but instead a Western imperial habit. France presents itself as republican liberator while carrying the file of Saint-Domingue, restored slavery, Haiti's indemnity, colonial conquest, and Françafrique. Britain remembers itself as abolitionist while the state compensated slave-owners and then reorganized coercion through empire. The United States calls itself the land of freedom while institutionalizing covert action and global primacy doctrines. The clinical point is cold: the same powers that injure, extract, discipline, and destabilize repeatedly return as liberators, partners, teachers, and guardians [50-60].

The 'youngest continent' framing intensifies the problem. Demographically, Africa has one of the youngest populations in the world. But in the mouth of a former colonial power, speaking at a summit designed to reset influence, the phrase does not remain a neutral statistic. It activates an older colonial grammar: Africa as immature, France as mature; Africa as potential, France as guide; Africa as future, France as interpreter; Africa as energy, France as reason. This is how

modern paternalism works. It no longer says openly, 'We must civilize you.' It says, 'We believe in your youth, your innovation, your potential, your future,' while quietly preserving the right to define the terms of that future.

The interruption of an African event to demand silence belongs to the same symbolic order. Multiple reports described Macron leaving his seat, interrupting a presentation, and taking the microphone to scold or silence a noisy audience during the Nairobi summit [6, 7]. The issue is not whether audiences should be respectful. Of course a speaker deserves to be heard. The issue is authority. In a sovereign setting, the host restores order. The chair restores order. The African institution responsible for the event restores order. A foreign president does not become schoolmaster unless the room has already granted him symbolic permission. Macron acted as if the African space was available for his discipline. That posture is the scandal.

The defence context reinforces the same concern without needing to overstate the case. AP reported that the Kenya-France Defence Cooperation Agreement was signed in October 2025, ratified in April 2026, and criticized by Kenyan civil society over immunity and local-jurisdiction concerns for French troops; Al Jazeera reported claims that the agreement grants diplomatic-style immunity, gives Paris primary jurisdiction over offences by French soldiers on Kenyan soil, and allows convicted personnel to serve sentences in France, while Kenyan officials deny that serious crimes such as murder would escape Kenyan courts [4, 46]. This is exactly why the doctrine must distinguish allegation from proof, but never confuse unresolved risk with harmlessness. Where foreign forces, contractors, weapons, logistics, intelligence access, and jurisdictional privileges converge, African intelligence must treat the arrangement as a high-risk environment requiring safeguards before trust.

This is why African naivety must end. The event was not a misunderstanding. It was not a minor protocol incident. It was not a harmless demographic phrase. It was not a harmless rhetorical flourish. It was a complete performance of hierarchy: the former colonial power disciplines the room, defines the doctrine, calls the continent young, and presents itself as the true custodian of African liberation. Anyone who treats this as ordinary diplomacy has already accepted the grammar of subordination.

The deeper danger is not only Macron's arrogance. The deeper danger is the African elite class that keeps translating foreign arrogance into acceptable diplomatic language. These elites will call it partnership. They will call it pragmatism. They will call it maturity. They will tell the people not to overreact. Yet the same people who show infinite patience toward foreign contempt often show no patience toward their own citizens, activists, students, workers, journalists, and youth. Their restraint is selective. Their courage is domestic. Their diplomacy is too often servility with a polished vocabulary.

The Nairobi moment therefore forces a basic test: if African leaders and intellectuals cannot defend dignity, the lowest-cost form of sovereignty, how can they be trusted to defend territory, minerals, law, currency, children, institutions, intelligence, borders, or the future? If they cannot push back when the humiliation is public and obvious, they will not push back when the pressure is private and expensive. If dignity is already too much, sovereignty is theater.

2. Conceptual Definition: Colonial Narcissistic Inversion

The Nairobi moment requires a concept strong enough to name what ordinary diplomatic vocabulary tries to hide. It is not enough to call Macron's statement arrogant, tone-deaf, insulting, or provocative. Those words describe the surface. They do not capture the deeper

operation. The deeper operation is that the former colonial power claims the moral vocabulary of the liberation movement created against colonial power itself. That operation is Colonial Narcissistic Inversion.

Colonial Narcissistic Inversion is the act by which a former or continuing colonial power recasts itself as the authentic representative, guardian, teacher, or moral author of the liberation tradition created against its own domination. In simpler terms, the colonizer steals the language of liberation and uses it to re-center himself.

This is precisely what happens when France, through Macron, claims to be the 'true Pan-Africanist.' Pan-Africanism was not created by France. It was not born in French institutions. It was not formed in the imagination of the French state. It was born from the wounds of enslavement, colonial conquest, racial hierarchy, territorial fragmentation, forced labor, resource extraction, cultural humiliation, and the repeated denial of African sovereignty. Pan-Africanism is the doctrine that says Africa and African-descended peoples must no longer be governed, interpreted, divided, exploited, disciplined, or validated by external powers [8-15].

For France to claim Pan-African authorship is therefore not merely inaccurate. It is an inversion of moral history. The political tradition built against domination is seized by one of the historical symbols of domination. The accused presents himself as the judge. The former master presents himself as the tutor of freedom. The arsonist claims to be the architect of fire safety. The system that helped create the wound appears at the bedside as the doctor of healing.

This is why the word narcissistic matters. The narcissistic structure cannot tolerate decentering. It cannot accept that liberation may occur without it. It cannot allow the formerly dominated to define themselves independently.

It must reappear inside the story, not as the offender, but as the guide, the partner, the visionary, the indispensable adult in the room. In this sense, Colonial Narcissistic Inversion is not only a lie about history. It is a refusal to surrender centrality.

The word colonial also matters. This is not ordinary individual vanity. It is not simply the ego of one president. It is a state tradition. It belongs to a long pattern in which imperial power changes its language whenever the old vocabulary becomes morally unusable. 'Civilizing mission' becomes 'cooperation.' 'Cooperation' becomes 'development.' 'Development' becomes 'security.' 'Security' becomes 'counterterrorism.' 'Counterterrorism' becomes 'partnership.' 'Partnership' becomes 'innovation.' And now, in Nairobi, 'partnership' attempts to become 'true Pan-Africanism.' The method is always the same: the hierarchy survives by changing costume.

Colonial Narcissistic Inversion has four basic features. First, it appropriates the vocabulary of resistance. Second, it erases historical responsibility. Third, it reverses moral roles. Fourth, it tests submission. It forces African leaders, intellectuals, journalists, diplomats, and youth to reveal whether they can still recognize symbolic domination. Will they object? Will they correct the frame? Will they defend the meaning of Pan-Africanism? Or will they remain silent because the insult arrived with presidential protocol, investment language, and diplomatic prestige?

Colonial Narcissistic Inversion must also be distinguished from ordinary hypocrisy. Hypocrisy means saying one thing and doing another. Inversion goes further. It seizes the moral position of the injured party. It does not only contradict Pan-Africanism; it impersonates it. It does not only weaken liberation language; it occupies it. That is why the Nairobi statement is more serious than diplomatic arrogance. It is an attempted symbolic capture of Pan-Africanism itself.

3. Psycho-Historical Lens: France Has Not Exited Empire

The Nairobi moment must be situated inside a longer psycho-historical pattern. France's problem in Africa is not only diplomatic. It is not only economic. It is not only military. It is psychological and historical. France has not fully accepted that Africa can exist politically, intellectually, militarily, economically, and symbolically without French centrality. That is the root of the problem.

Empire does not always end when flags come down. Empire often survives as a mental structure. It survives as a reflex of entitlement, a habit of instruction, a need to supervise, a compulsion to define, a refusal to be decentered. The colonial state may withdraw its administrators, reduce its troops, rename its bases, rebrand its aid, diversify its partnerships, and speak the language of equality. Yet the deeper imperial reflex can remain intact: Africa must still be guided, interpreted, corrected, financed, protected, disciplined, or certified by Europe.

This is the psycho-historical meaning of Macron's claim. France does not merely seek relations with Africa, it seeks interpretive authority over Africa altogether. It wants to name what responsible Pan-Africanism is. It wants to distinguish 'good' African sovereignty from 'bad' African sovereignty. It wants to decide which African anger is legitimate and which is dangerous. It wants to be accepted not merely as a partner, but as a mature actor whose judgment should organize Africa's future.

France's African policy has repeatedly operated through this pattern of re-skinning. When direct colonial rule became morally indefensible, it became cooperation. When cooperation became suspect, it became development. When development exposed dependency, it became security. When security generated rejection, it became partnership. When partnership lost

credibility, it became innovation, youth, finance, climate, risk reform, and now, most absurdly, 'true Pan-Africanism.' The words change because the old words become unusable. The structure persists because the underlying interest remains [16-22].

The psycho-historical pattern has four visible traits. First, there is imperial narcissism: the refusal to accept that Africa's dignity can exist without French recognition. Second, there is Machiavellian rebranding: a loss of influence is presented as moral renewal. Third, there is historical erasure: France speaks as if it arrives in Africa without a file. Fourth, there is symbolic sadism or at minimum symbolic indifference: the colonizer does not merely ask to be forgiven; he asks to be crowned inside the liberation tradition.

France can celebrate African independence while fearing African autonomy. It can praise African youth while seeking influence over their formation. It can condemn coups while tolerating client regimes. It can speak of democracy while prioritizing strategic obedience. It can support development while protecting asymmetrical contracts. It can claim partnership while demanding military access. It can speak of equality while expecting deference. It can praise Pan-Africanism while opposing the kind of Pan-African sovereignty that would reduce French leverage.

A mature African analysis must therefore reject the childish idea that every French-African tension is caused by misunderstanding, poor communication, anti-French sentiment, Russian propaganda, or emotional populism. Those explanations are convenient because they protect the deeper structure. They treat African anger as a problem to be managed, not as evidence of repeated historical injury. They pathologize resistance while normalizing domination.

The psycho-historical conclusion is clear: France has not fully exited empire because France has not fully accepted decentering. It still seeks to stand inside Africa's story as guide, partner, financier, security provider, educator, moderator, and now even Pan-Africanist. That centrality is the problem. A truly post-imperial France would not claim to be the true Pan-Africanist. It would ask what Pan-Africanism requires of France: withdrawal where demanded, accountability where owed, restitution where justified, fair contracts where distorted, transparency where hidden, and humility where arrogance has become habitual.

3A. Western Imperial Inversion: The Captor as Liberator

Macron is not the disease by himself. He is a symptom with a presidential face. The deeper pathology is Western Imperial Inversion: the recurring mechanism by which a power that enslaved, colonized, extracted, destabilized, or subordinated later narrates itself as liberator, democrat, abolitionist, partner, security provider, or moral adult. This is not ordinary hypocrisy. Hypocrisy says one thing and does another. Inversion does something colder: it converts the very history of domination into evidence of moral superiority.

Western Imperial Inversion is one geopolitical mechanism of the Crying Demon Syndrome. In that reference framework, the Crying Demon Syndrome names a recurrent psychosocial and political formation in which an actor, institution, or system inflicts, preserves, benefits from, or intensifies asymmetrical harm while occupying the communicative and moral position of the wounded. Through grievance display, sacred fragility, trauma-coded shielding, burden language, or emergency rhetoric, scrutiny is recoded as cruelty, the harmed are displaced toward suspicion, and the harmful actor acquires renewed emotional and procedural cover [61]. In imperial settings, the demon cries not because it

has stopped harming, but because its authority to harm has been challenged. The tears are not repentance. They are narrative weapons.

The mechanism has a recognizable structure. First, violence or domination produces resistance. Second, the dominant power loses the old form of control because the moral cost becomes too visible. Third, it abandons the old vocabulary and keeps the strategic relation alive under a new language. Fourth, it teaches the world to remember the moment of reform while forgetting the preceding crime, the beneficiaries, the compensation flows, and the continued structure of power. In the final stage, the former captor returns as guardian of the captive's liberation.

France supplies the most direct case for this paper. In 1794, revolutionary France abolished slavery in law across its colonial empire. In 1802, under Napoleon, France sent expeditions to the Caribbean to restore the old plantation economy and metropolitan authority, with Saint-Domingue as the central battlefield [50, 51]. The enslaved and formerly enslaved Africans who fought for freedom were not welcomed as the moral teachers of the Republic. They were treated as a rebellion to be crushed. France did not liberate them. They liberated themselves against France.

The Haitian case exposes the obscenity of French emancipatory memory. Haiti declared independence in 1804 after defeating the French colonial project. In 1825, France forced Haiti to pay an indemnity of 150 million francs to compensate former colonists for losses, including enslaved human beings counted as property, in exchange for recognition of independence [52, 53]. The clinical judgment is unavoidable: the same state that failed to crush Black freedom then made Black freedom pay ransom to the former masters. A republic capable of that act has no moral standing to crown itself the true Pan-Africanist without

radical repair, restitution, humility, and submission to African-defined terms.

Françafrique follows the same re-skinning logic. French presidents repeatedly announce rupture with the old system. Hollande declared in Dakar in 2012 that the time of Françafrique was over; Sarkozy had promised earlier to end the system; Macron presented his 2017 Ouagadougou speech as a generational reset and later repeated that the age of Françafrique was finished [59, 60]. The repetition is the confession. A system that must be buried every few years is not dead. It is changing costume. Each farewell becomes part of the performance that allows the next form of influence to survive.

Britain offers the abolitionist version of the same inversion. The British Empire remembers itself through the noble image of abolition. But the Slavery Abolition Act of 1833 included a massive compensation package of 20 million pounds for slave-owners, administered through the Bank of England, while the enslaved received no equivalent compensation [54]. UCL's Legacies of British Slavery project summarizes the moral imbalance clearly: slave owners were compensated; the enslaved received nothing [55]. The British state therefore did not simply end slavery. It paid the owners of the crime scene and then expanded imperial domination through colonial rule, forced labor regimes, extraction, discipline, and racial hierarchy. Abolition became a national virtue story, while colonialism reorganized the same contempt into imperial administration.

The United States provides the modern security version. It calls itself the land of the free and presents itself as a global defender of democracy, but its own security state institutionalized covert action as an instrument of foreign policy. NSC 10/2, approved in June 1948, directed the CIA to conduct covert operations so planned and executed that U.S. government responsibility would not be evident and could be plausibly disclaimed if uncovered [56]. In 1953, the CIA

backed the overthrow of Iran's Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh; the agency later publicly acknowledged that the coup it supported was undemocratic [57].

The primacy doctrine is equally revealing. The 1992 Defense Planning Guidance, produced after the Soviet collapse, stated that U.S. strategy required preventing any hostile power from dominating regions whose resources could generate global power, and the leaked debate around the document became associated with preventing the re-emergence of a rival [58]. In plain terms, the United States may speak the language of freedom, partnership, and rules, but its security architecture has repeatedly treated other nations' strategic autonomy as a problem when that autonomy threatens U.S. primacy. This is not the politics of a neutral partner. Instead the world is witnessing the psychology of a power that calls domination order when it is the one doing the ordering.

The novelty of the present argument is therefore not that Western empires committed crimes. That is not new. The novelty is the clinical-political structure: Western power does not merely deny domination; it converts domination into moral entitlement. France does not simply deny Françafrique; it repeatedly announces its end while preserving rebranded influence. Britain does not simply remember slavery; it remembers abolition in a way that centers British virtue while displacing enslaved African agency and compensation injustice. The United States does not simply exercise power; it narrates primacy as freedom, intervention as democracy, and covert manipulation as security necessity.

This is why the word pathology is justified. The pattern shows a narcissistic inability to relate to the non-West except through centrality. The West must be founder, savior, liberator, donor, judge, investor, teacher, security provider, or indispensable partner. Even when it caused the wound, it returns as the authority on healing.

Even when it built the cage, it returns as the expert on freedom. Even when it destabilizes, it returns as the architect of stability. That is moral self-exemption elevated into diplomacy.

For African institutions, the operational consequence is simple: every Western claim of liberation, partnership, democracy, abolition, development, security, or Pan-African friendship must pass a Material Truth Test. Who was harmed? Who was compensated? Who retained power? Who wrote the narrative? Who gained access? Who controls jurisdiction? Who defines the terms? Who can say no? Who benefits if the arrangement continues? Who pays if it fails? If these questions are not answered materially, the relationship remains a slogan wrapped around asymmetry.

Macron's Nairobi claim is therefore not an isolated absurdity, but a perfect symptom of the larger Western habit: the power that dominated now seeks applause for naming itself liberator. The correct African response is not polite confusion but disciplined contempt, not as irrational hatred of peoples but as the moral refusal to treat a historically fraudulent posture as respectable. A refusal to clap when the captor returns as savior, the refusal to call domination partnership because the oppressor has learned softer words.

4. Cognitive-Diplomatic Lens: The Battle Over Meaning

The Nairobi moment was not only a political incident. It was a battle over meaning. The deeper question is not merely what Macron said, but what his words attempted to authorize. Who has the right to define Pan-Africanism? Who has the right to define Africa's maturity? Who has the right to describe African sovereignty as responsible or irresponsible? Who decides whether African resistance is dignity, extremism, populism, foreign manipulation, or immaturity? These are not academic questions. They are questions of power.

Colonial domination does not only seize land. It seizes vocabulary. It seizes the right to name reality. It teaches the dominated to describe their own subordination in the language of order, partnership, cooperation, stability, and realism. It trains elites to repeat words that sound neutral while hiding relations that are unequal. This is why the final stage of empire is not always military occupation, nor is it economical colonisation, but instead, semantic occupation: the colonized still speak, but the colonizer has trained the frame through which speech becomes acceptable.

That is why Macron's claim that France is the 'true Pan-Africanist' is so dangerous. It does not merely mislabel France. It tries to move France from the dock of historical accountability into the chair of moral interpretation. It attempts to make France an authorized speaker of African liberation. Once that move is accepted, Pan-Africanism itself is softened, distorted, weaponized against liberation. It no longer means the organized struggle against foreign domination: It becomes a polite vocabulary of summits, investment, youth, innovation, mobility, security, and partnership. The word remains African. The content and not just external institutions that are easier to recognize and replace, becomes externally managed.

This is cognitive-diplomatic warfare. It is cognitive because it targets perception and perception shapes psychology, policies and actions.

It asks Africans to see domination as partnership, dependency as cooperation, strategic access as solidarity, and humiliation as diplomatic firmness. It is diplomatic because it happens inside respectable settings: summits, panels, communiqués, investment forums, bilateral agreements, security partnerships, and official speeches. It does not arrive as an insult shouted from the street. It arrives wearing a protocol.

The phrase 'youngest continent' must be read in this framework. At the demographic level, it can refer to Africa's young population. But political language cannot be detached from the speaker, the setting, and the history. When a former colonial power describes Africa primarily as young while positioning itself as the mature partner, the phrase carries a paternalistic charge. It can produce a hierarchy without naming one: Africa as childlike potential, France as adult guidance; Africa as energy, France as structure; Africa as future, France as reason; Africa as promise, France as method.

Africa is not a child continent. Africa has one of the youngest populations, but it is not young in civilization, memory, suffering, knowledge, spirituality, resistance, science, language, music, agriculture, mathematics, metallurgy, architecture, statecraft, or historical depth. To reduce Africa to youth while ignoring its civilizational authority is to make it available for supervision. It is to convert demographic strength into political immaturity. The necessary correction is simple: Africa has a young population. Africa is not a minor.

The interruption of the Nairobi speech belongs to the same cognitive-diplomatic pattern. The issue is not whether an audience should be quiet. The issue is who claims the authority to impose order, in what tone, in whose house, before whom, and with what historical baggage. In a sovereign African setting, the African host moderates. The chair moderates. The institution moderates. A foreign president does not assume the role of schoolmaster unless the room has already accepted symbolic subordination.

The cognitive-diplomatic battle therefore requires a new African discipline: definitional sovereignty. African concepts must be defined by African historical experience, not by foreign convenience. Pan-Africanism must be protected from dilution. Sovereignty must not be reduced to flag ceremony. Partnership must be measured, not proclaimed. Reciprocity must be material,

not merely textual. Youth must not become infantilization. Diplomacy must not become cowardice. Maturity must not mean the quiet acceptance of contempt.

A nation that does not control the meaning of its own dignity will not control the terms of its own sovereignty. The diplomatic class must therefore be retrained. Every key word must be tested: when they say partnership, ask who gains access; when they say reciprocity, ask where the material symmetry is; when they say youth, ask whether they are empowering or infantilizing; when they say security, ask who controls the intelligence; when they say investment, ask who owns the infrastructure; when they say reform, ask who writes the rules; when they say Pan-Africanism, ask whether it reduces or increases African autonomy.

5. Security-Strategic Lens: Words Prepare Access

The Nairobi moment cannot be confined to symbolism. Symbolism matters because it prepares material arrangements. A foreign power does not first seize territory. It first prepares language. It speaks of partnership, cooperation, modernization, security, stability, youth, investment, and shared future. Those words soften the terrain. They make strategic access appear benevolent. They make unequal presence appear normal. They make legal concessions appear technical. They make sovereignty loss appear sophisticated.

Pan-Africanism is not a cultural decoration. It is not an emotional slogan. It is a sovereignty doctrine. It means African control over African territory, law, security, currencies, strategic resources, infrastructure, knowledge systems, diplomatic alignments, and historical memory. A state cannot call itself Pan-Africanist while seeking privileges that dilute African jurisdiction or preserve foreign strategic leverage over African space.

The security question is simple: does the relationship increase African autonomy, or does it increase foreign access? That question cuts through diplomatic fog. If a partnership gives an external power deeper military access, intelligence access, logistical access, legal shields, influence over critical infrastructure, influence over security doctrine, or access to strategic sectors without equivalent African leverage, then the relationship is not sovereign partnership. It instead qualifies as managed dependency.

This is where the language of reciprocity often becomes deceptive. A treaty or agreement may say that both parties enjoy similar rights. But formal symmetry is not the same as material symmetry. Two states can sign the same sentence while living in radically unequal realities. One side may have troops, bases, intelligence infrastructure, logistical reach, diplomatic pressure, corporate networks, and historical influence. The other may have territory, resources, legal exposure, and political vulnerability. On paper, both are equal. In practice, one projects power and the other absorbs risk.

This is the difference between verbal reciprocity and sovereign reciprocity. Verbal reciprocity means both parties are described equally in the text. Sovereign reciprocity means both parties possess comparable presence, leverage, access, jurisdictional exposure, operational capacity, and consequences. Most African agreements with major powers fail this test. They may use balanced words, but the balance exists in grammar, not in power.

If the arrangement is truly reciprocal, where is the equivalent African military presence in France? Where are Kenyan military installations in France? Where are Kenyan troops deployed on French soil with legal protections? Where is Kenyan intelligence access to French strategic infrastructure? Where is Kenya's leverage over French ports, energy systems, logistics corridors, military doctrine, telecommunications, or critical

data? If the answer is nowhere, then the relationship is not materially reciprocal. It is legally symmetrical but strategically unequal.

The argument becomes especially urgent where military immunity is concerned. Immunity is not a technical courtesy. It is a jurisdictional privilege. It affects who can arrest, investigate, prosecute, subpoena, inspect, detain, search, question, and hold accountable. In a strong and equal relationship, jurisdiction is clear, limited, transparent, and accountable. In a weak or asymmetrical relationship, immunity becomes a shield behind which abuses can disappear into diplomatic handling.

The security doctrine must be blunt: immunity must never precede trust. Trust must be earned through accountability. A foreign soldier operating on African soil must not stand above African law by default. A foreign military adviser must not become untouchable because an agreement was written in balanced language. A foreign contractor must not be protected from investigation because he belongs to a strategic partner. A foreign intelligence channel must not escape oversight because officials fear diplomatic embarrassment.

Where there are troops, weapons, money, logistics chains, intelligence contacts, diplomatic cover, and unequal jurisdiction, there must be strict accountability. This does not mean every foreign soldier is guilty. It means the risk profile is known. Serious risk governance demands child protection, sexual exploitation safeguards, trafficking safeguards, weapons diversion controls, drug route monitoring, mineral smuggling controls, cargo and logistics audits, contractor accountability, and parliamentary oversight [23-26]. Anything less is negligence.

This is where symbolic dignity and hard security meet. A leader who tolerates public humiliation will often tolerate private pressure. A state that lets a foreign power define Pan-Africanism may later let it define security. An elite that applauds

symbolic dominance may later sign legal dominance. The failure to defend meaning becomes the failure to defend territory.

6. The Immunity Trap: Accountability Before Trust

The immunity question is where diplomatic fiction becomes legal danger. It is easy for officials to hide behind the word reciprocity. It sounds balanced. It sounds normal. It sounds legally mature. But in asymmetric relationships, reciprocity can become one of the most deceptive words in diplomacy. It can make an unequal arrangement appear equal because both parties are mentioned in the same sentence.

A foreign military immunity clause is not a small administrative detail. It decides who can be searched, arrested, detained, questioned, investigated, prosecuted, sued, disciplined, extradited, or shielded. It decides whether an African victim faces an African court, a foreign military tribunal, a closed diplomatic process, or silence. It decides whether evidence remains under national control or disappears into classified channels. It decides whether a foreign soldier is treated as a guest under African law or as a protected actor standing partly outside it.

No foreign soldier should receive broad legal protection before the host state has secured jurisdiction, evidence access, victim protection, investigative power, parliamentary oversight, and termination rights. No foreign government should be allowed to say, 'Trust us,' while asking for legal shields on African territory. Trust is not a legal framework. Trust is not an investigation mechanism. Trust is not a child-protection policy. Trust is not a remedy for abuse. Trust is not sovereignty.

A sovereign state does not wait for scandal before designing safeguards. A serious state asks in advance: who investigates if a child is abused; who protects the complainant; who secures evidence; who controls forensic access; who questions the suspect; who prevents the suspect

from leaving the country; who informs parliament; who informs the public; who compensates victims; who audits military logistics; who inspects cargo; who monitors weapons movement; who tracks contractors; who reviews intelligence activity; who terminates the agreement if the foreign partner obstructs accountability?

African intelligence services should treat foreign immunity as a high-risk vulnerability. Not because all foreign forces are criminals, but because immunity creates precisely the kind of legal opacity that hostile, abusive, corrupt, or predatory actors can exploit. The state must assume that any protected corridor can be misused: by soldiers, contractors, intelligence intermediaries, logistics operators, smugglers, informants, private companies, or politically connected actors.

Where there are allegations or patterns involving child abuse, trafficking, mineral smuggling, weapons flows, drugs, illegal logistics, or covert interference in conflict environments, African intelligence must treat them as due-diligence triggers. Allegation is not conviction. But allegation plus power asymmetry plus immunity plus weak oversight equals strategic risk. A serious state does not wait for proof after victims have been exposed. It designs safeguards before exposure.

The correct doctrine is no immunity without jurisdictional architecture. That architecture must include African primary jurisdiction for serious crimes committed on African soil; mandatory joint investigation; no unilateral evacuation of suspects; victim and witness protection; parliamentary notification and oversight; independent complaint channels; logistics and cargo audit rights; contractor accountability; automatic suspension clauses for obstruction; and public reporting, at least in aggregate.

The moral issue is severe. An African state has no right to expose its own citizens to legal uncertainty in order to make a foreign partner comfortable. A child, woman, worker, civilian, protester, driver, cleaner, translator, local contractor, journalist, or soldier harmed by a foreign military actor must not become a sacrifice on the altar of diplomacy. If the state cannot protect them because it signed away jurisdiction too casually, then the state has failed at its most basic function.

This is not specifically anti-French, but pro-sovereignty. The same doctrine must apply to every external power. France, the United States, China, Russia, Britain, Turkey, the Gulf states, or any other actor should face the same standard. African sovereignty cannot depend on the flag of the foreign partner. It must depend on the structure of the agreement.

7. Predictive Lens: What This Signals Next

The Nairobi moment should not be treated only as a past event. It should be treated as an early-warning signal. Serious political analysis does not merely describe what happened. It asks what the event reveals about the next phase of strategy. Macron's language, posture, and timing indicate that France's African policy is entering a phase of rebranding, not withdrawal from ambition.

The old French presence in Africa has become politically costly. Military bases are contested. Public opinion is more hostile. Youth movements are less deferential. Francophone African populations increasingly recognize the pattern of dependency. Anti-French sentiment is no longer marginal. The old vocabulary of cooperation no longer persuades. The old security narrative no longer commands automatic trust. The old elite networks are less able to contain popular anger. France therefore needs a new costume.

That costume will not look like colonial rule. It will not always look like direct military occupation. It will look modern, technical,

youthful, financial, ecological, digital, entrepreneurial, and diplomatic. It will use the language of the twenty-first century. France will increasingly seek to replace the image of the soldier with the image of the investor, the innovator, the climate partner, the AI partner, the youth partner, the security reform partner, and now the Pan-Africanist partner.

This does not mean every investment, every innovation project, every cultural program, or every security dialogue is automatically hostile. That would be lazy analysis. The correct question is not whether the vocabulary sounds positive. The question is whether the structure increases African autonomy or foreign leverage. If the language is modern but the power relation remains unequal, the old dependency has only changed clothing.

The next phase of French influence will likely operate through several channels: youth diplomacy; innovation diplomacy; financial re-entry through risk-pricing, debt, and infrastructure mechanisms; security re-legitimation; elite pipeline building; cultural rebranding; and semantic capture of Pan-Africanism itself. France may attempt to distinguish between good Pan-Africanism and bad Pan-Africanism. Good Pan-Africanism will be described as open, pragmatic, investment-friendly, moderate, cooperative, institutional, and compatible with Europe. Bad Pan-Africanism will be framed as emotional, anti-French, populist, extremist, manipulated by rivals, hostile to democracy, or economically irresponsible. This distinction will not be innocent. It will be used to domesticate African sovereignty.

The predictive warning is blunt: when empire loses the barracks, it seeks the bank. When it loses the flag, it seeks the platform. When it loses the colonial classroom, it seeks the fellowship program. When it loses moral authority, it steals the language of liberation. This is not suspicion

for its own sake. It is disciplined counterintelligence applied to diplomacy.

A practical early-warning matrix should classify foreign engagement into four risk levels. Low risk: cooperation that is transparent, time-limited, African-led, jurisdictionally accountable, and capacity-building toward autonomy. Moderate risk: cooperation that is useful but creates dependency in training, finance, technology, or intelligence unless mitigated. High risk: cooperation involving foreign military access, immunity, critical infrastructure, data transfer, resource corridors, elite pipeline control, or unclear ownership. Critical risk: cooperation that combines foreign security presence, legal immunity, strategic infrastructure access, weak oversight, opaque financing, elite capture, and narrative control.

The conclusion is clear: the Nairobi moment signals a shift from old *Françafrique* to rebranded influence. Less crude, more networked. Less openly colonial, more semantic. Less dependent on flags, more dependent on finance, platforms, youth, security, and elite legitimacy. It will praise Africa while seeking access. It will speak of equality while preserving asymmetry. It will condemn old paternalism while practicing updated paternalism. It will call itself Pan-African if that helps. Africa must not be fooled.

8. Elite Failure: African Intellectuals Must Grow Up

The Nairobi moment exposed more than Macron's arrogance. It exposed the immaturity of a large portion of the African diplomatic and intellectual class. A serious people cannot keep treating every foreign insult as a misunderstanding, every external provocation as a protocol matter, every public humiliation as an unfortunate tone issue, and every asymmetrical agreement as partnership because the word reciprocity appears somewhere in the text.

African intellectuals need to grow up.

Maturity does not mean silence before contempt. Maturity does not mean translating humiliation into nuance. Maturity does not mean performing diplomatic sophistication while the basic dignity of the continent is trampled in public. Maturity means recognizing power when it performs itself. It means identifying domination even when domination arrives with smiling language, investment vocabulary, youth programs, innovation summits, and polished communiques.

Macron's intervention at Nairobi was not neutral. Multiple outlets reported that he interrupted an ongoing presentation, left his seat, took the microphone, and demanded silence from the audience during the Africa Forward Summit at the University of Nairobi [6, 7]. The issue is not whether audiences should respect speakers. They should. The issue is who claimed authority over the room. In a sovereign African setting, the host corrects disorder. The chair corrects disorder. The African institution responsible for the event corrects disorder. A foreign president does not appoint himself schoolmaster unless the symbolic hierarchy of the room already allows him to imagine that role.

That is the scandal.

It is difficult to imagine a comparable scene in which a foreign head of state walks into the French National Assembly, seizes the microphone, interrupts an elected speaker, and disciplines French parliamentarians as though they were unruly pupils. French parliamentary life can be loud, combative, and chaotic; yet in France such disorder is treated as domestic political life, not as an invitation for a foreign leader to impose order. In Africa, Macron acted with a comfort that reveals the deeper problem: he behaved as though African space remained available for French correction.

This is why the African reaction matters. When elites tolerate this, they do not merely preserve protocol. They grant permission for escalation. The foreign actor learns the boundary. He learns

that African dignity can be tested, pushed, and normalized as a lower standard. If public symbolic discipline is tolerated, private strategic pressure becomes easier. If the room accepts humiliation in the open, it will likely accept worse in closed negotiations.

This is the lesson African elites keep failing to learn.

A people that cannot defend the symbolic boundary of the room will struggle to defend the legal boundary of the treaty, the security boundary of the base, the economic boundary of the resource corridor, the digital boundary of the data center, or the moral boundary of the child. Dignity is not cosmetic, secondary or conditional. It must be understood as the first and cheapest test of sovereignty. With that understanding, failures at more challenging and higher stakes tests become predictable: one cannot be unable to grasp the lower hanging fruits and believe they can climb a mountain. If raising a hand to grab a fruit proves too much of an effort, too costly, too dangerous, than climbing a mountain remains a fantasy: proving unable to protect one's interests in a low-stake low-risk situation, predicts failure when the risk, stakes and pressure rise.

9. The False Diplomacy Class: Aggressive at Home, Servile Abroad

The most contemptible part of the Nairobi moment is not just the usual foreign arrogance. The African class that reserves its aggression for Africans and its softness for external power is the most concerning symptom. Witnessing this theatre as Pan-African organizations manifest and hold a summit for sovereignty at the same time in Nairobi, allows to make an easy prediction, images all are accustomed to see: Police protecting the foreign authorities, people dancing to welcome them under the name of "culture" and "equal partnership" -while never doing so for fellow African heads of state- circulation restrictions for the locals -with no

reciprocity for African heads of state, and simultaneously, moderate to severe repression against Pan-Africanism.

This class is harsh with its own people. It lectures youth. It mocks activists. It dismisses public anger. It polices students. It insults citizens. It calls domestic critics emotional, manipulated, immature, dangerous, or irresponsible. It knows how to raise its voice when facing workers, students, journalists, opposition groups, ordinary citizens, and the poor.

Yet before foreign power, this same class suddenly becomes calm, refined, cautious, diplomatic, and forgiving. That double standard is not maturity. It is servility.

This is the institutionalisation of negative narcissism and ingroup sadism:

A leader who can shout at African citizens but cannot correct a foreign insult has revealed his true political orientation and pathological behavioural pattern. An intellectual who ridicules African anger but sanitizes European arrogance has revealed his foreign loyalty. A diplomat who demands respect from ordinary Africans but accepts symbolic discipline from a foreign president has revealed the limits of his survival instinct.

Such people do not deserve intellectual respect when they criticize African outrage. Their criticism is not wisdom. It is often the defensive reflex of a class addicted to foreign validation. They call ritual humiliation "protocol". They call fear "realism". They call silence maturity. They call dependency "partnership". They call external approval credibility and public dignity populism.

This vocabulary must be broken, to dismantle the psychology

The problem is not diplomacy. Africa needs diplomacy. The problem is institutional weakness rebranded as false diplomacy, which means the conversion of elite fear into

respectable language. False diplomacy tells the people to remain calm while foreign power takes liberties. False diplomacy tells African youth to be polite while strategic concessions are signed. False diplomacy treats the dignity of the foreign guest as sacred and the dignity of African people as negotiable. It grants full immunity to hostile foreign military with documented patterns of abuse and an active cooperation with terrorists on African soil.

This class deserves contempt because it has inverted the moral order. It fears embarrassing France more than it fears betraying Africa. It fears losing invitations more than losing sovereignty. It fears being seen as radical more than being used as a decorative intermediary. It fears the displeasure of embassies more than the judgment of history.

Betrayal must not be seen as symbolic only. It has measurable impacts in stolen: resources, opportunities, legitimacy, lands, water, lives and bodies including children. Betrayal deprives us Africans, of capabilities to shape our own future, to grant those capabilities to the very entities that cynically experimented not on distant ancestors but our direct parents and grandparents, kidnapped and trafficked our children not centuries ago but just a minute ago. These entities that refuse to name it a crime against humanity.

No leader should be allowed to promote a forgiveness theater for such unforgivable activities while punishing the citizens for demanding dignity.

That is not leadership but managed weakness and glorified servitude.

10. Strategic Doctrine: No Dignity, No Mandate

The Nairobi moment must not end as commentary. If it remains only commentary, it will become another scandal consumed, debated, and forgotten. It must become doctrine. A

doctrine is stronger than outrage because it survives the moment. It turns indignation into standards. It gives citizens, intellectuals, diplomats, students, soldiers, journalists, and institutions a way to judge leaders before the next humiliation arrives.

The doctrine begins with a simple principle: no dignity, no mandate. This does not mean that leaders must act theatrically, shout in public, insult foreign guests, or turn every disagreement into confrontation. Dignity is not noise. Dignity is the capacity to preserve the moral, legal, historical, and strategic boundary of the people one claims to represent.

A leader with dignity can be calm. A diplomat with dignity can be courteous. An intellectual with dignity can be nuanced. A state with dignity can cooperate. But none of them can allow foreign power to define African liberation, infantilize African maturity, discipline African space, dilute African jurisdiction, or convert African sovereignty into ceremonial language. Dignity is not the opposite of diplomacy. It is the foundation of serious diplomacy.

The doctrine can be stated in four lines: no dignity, no mandate; no courage, no negotiation authority; no sovereignty instinct, no public power; no capacity to confront insult, no right to manage national survival. Each line has institutional meaning. Office without dignity becomes occupation by weakness. Technical expertise without courage can become efficient surrender. Titles without sovereignty instinct become dangerous.

The doctrine should also define unacceptable behavior. An African leader, diplomat, intellectual, or security official should be considered unfit for strategic authority if he or she repeatedly treats foreign approval as proof of legitimacy; dismisses popular dignity as emotionalism; uses partnership without measuring power; uses reciprocity without measuring material symmetry; defends foreign

immunity without victim safeguards; attacks domestic critics more aggressively than foreign arrogance; calls humiliation protocol; confuses access with leverage; confuses funding with respect; confuses invitation with influence; confuses silence with maturity; or confuses dependency with realism.

The doctrine must impose practical tests before any major partnership: the Dignity Test, the Reciprocity Test, the Jurisdiction Test, the Autonomy Test, the Exit Test, the Transparency Test, and the People-First Test. These tests turn dignity into procedure. They prevent sovereignty from remaining a speech. They make it measurable.

The final doctrine is clear: dignity is not optional; it is the first evidence of sovereignty. Courage is not theatrical; it is the ability to impose limits. Partnership is not declared; it is proven by accountability. Reciprocity is not textual; it is material. Maturity is not submission; it is disciplined refusal where refusal is required.

11. Direct Rebuttal to Macron

The direct answer to Emmanuel Macron is evident, impossible to dilute: France is not the true Pan-Africanist. France may become a respectful partner. France may support African initiatives. France may trade, invest, cooperate, apologize, repair, return archives and stolen heritage, accept fairer terms, and work with African states under African-defined conditions. But France can never claim to be the authentic representative of Pan-Africanism while standing inside the historical file of slavery, colonial conquest, forced labor, resource extraction, cultural domination, military intervention, monetary dependency, and Françafrique. France can never center itself as more legitimate than Africans in their own struggle, like a crying demon of legends weaponizes their own tears to occupy the position of their victim and reverse the roles. That in itself, excludes sincerity.

Pan-Africanism was born against that world. It was born against the idea that Africa requires external supervision. It was born against the fragmentation of African peoples into colonial territories. It was born against the reduction of African states to resource fields, military corridors, labor reservoirs, client regimes, and diplomatic dependents. It was born against the arrogance that told Africans they were not mature enough to govern themselves, define themselves, defend themselves, teach themselves, industrialize themselves, or speak for themselves.

So when a French president claims that France is the true Pan-Africanist, the answer is not polite disagreement but historical correction:

France did not create Pan-Africanism even though it did contribute to create the conditions that made it necessary for survival, like an aggressor makes self-defense necessary. Can they then claim to be your true defender? France did not authorize Pan-Africanism. France did not pay the price of Pan-Africanism. France did not carry the chains, the forced labor, the exile, the assassinations, the stolen land, the looted resources, the destroyed cultures, the imposed borders, the humiliated languages, the military tutelage, the currency dependency, or the psychological violence that made Pan-Africanism necessary.

A true Pan-Africanist does not demand centrality in another people's liberation. A true Pan-Africanist does not convert historical guilt into moral leadership. A true Pan-Africanist does not call the continent young while placing himself in the posture of adult guide. A true Pan-Africanist does not discipline African spaces as if they were colonial classrooms. A true Pan-Africanist does not seek legal shields for foreign soldiers from African jurisdiction. A true Pan-Africanist does not hide asymmetrical power behind the word reciprocity. A true Pan-Africanist does not use partnership language to preserve access, leverage, and

influence. A true Pan-Africanist submits to African sovereignty.

If France wishes to be a partner, the path is available. It begins with humility, not self-coronation. It begins with accountability, not inversion. It begins with listening, not disciplining. It begins with repair, not rebranding. It begins with material equality, not ceremonial reciprocity. It begins with respecting African jurisdiction, not negotiating immunity. It begins with accepting that Africa's liberation vocabulary belongs first to those who suffered, resisted, organized, and continue to fight for self-determination.

France can be present as a partner under African law. It cannot be present as a supervisor disguised as ally. France can support African projects. It cannot define African destiny. France can cooperate with African institutions. It cannot replace African agency. France can participate in dialogue. It cannot seize the moral title of Pan-Africanism. The difference is fundamental.

12. Institutional Demands and Operational Framework

The Nairobi moment must now be converted into operational response. A serious people cannot stop at indignation, even justified indignation. Anger identifies the violation. Analysis explains the pattern. Doctrine sets the standard. But institutions must now translate the standard into action. The question is no longer only whether Macron was wrong. He was. The deeper question is what African states, intellectuals, media, civil society, security services, and Pan-African organizations must do so that this kind of symbolic and strategic domination becomes harder to repeat.

First, African institutions should establish a Pan-African Dignity and Sovereignty Protocol. The protocol should state that no foreign leader, ambassador, military officer, corporate executive, or institutional representative may claim authority over African liberation language,

discipline African institutional spaces, or frame Africa through paternalistic categories without correction. Such correction can remain polite, but it must be immediate.

Second, every major foreign agreement should pass a Reciprocity Audit before signing, ratification, renewal, or implementation. The audit asks whether both parties are equal only in wording or equal in practice; whether Africa can exercise the same rights in the foreign partner's territory; who gains access; who carries risk; who controls enforcement; who owns data, infrastructure, and outputs; and whether the arrangement can be terminated without national damage.

Third, African states should prohibit blanket immunity for foreign soldiers, contractors, trainers, advisers, and intelligence-linked personnel. Any immunity clause must be limited, transparent, and subject to serious safeguards: African primary jurisdiction for serious crimes; no evacuation of suspects before local investigation; joint investigation with African evidence control; protection for victims and witnesses; mandatory reporting to parliament; independent complaint channels; cargo, logistics, and contractor audits; suspension clauses for non-cooperation; public reporting of incidents and outcomes; and termination rights.

Fourth, African research centers, universities, intelligence schools, and civil society organizations should create a Foreign Influence Risk Index. This index would score foreign partnerships by military access, intelligence access, legal immunity, critical infrastructure, resource corridors, data control, finance and debt, youth influence, education and curriculum, media framing, elite pipeline creation, cultural heritage, and exit dependency.

Fifth, African diplomacy must be retrained. Diplomatic training should include historical memory of colonial and neocolonial patterns, detection of paternalistic language, strategic

communication under pressure, boundary-setting without theatrical escalation, treaty risk analysis, reciprocity analysis, jurisdictional protection, media response to foreign humiliation, negotiation exit strategy, and protection of African concepts from appropriation.

Sixth, African universities, think tanks, media platforms, and Pan-African organizations must protect core concepts from foreign appropriation. Terms requiring protection include Pan-Africanism, sovereignty, partnership, reciprocity, security cooperation, development, youth, democracy, stability, reform, innovation, risk, and modernization. Every time these words appear in foreign-led agreements or speeches, African analysts should ask who defines the term, who benefits from that definition, what material arrangement the term prepares, and whether it increases African autonomy or foreign leverage.

Seventh, African intellectuals should form a rapid response network capable of producing serious statements within hours or days. Its role would be to identify harmful framing, produce corrective language, provide public explanations, support media briefings, draft parliamentary questions, prepare legal and diplomatic recommendations, and prevent emotional outrage from being captured or dismissed.

Finally, Pan-African organizations should create common minimum standards for external partnerships so foreign powers cannot exploit fragmentation. No African state should become the weak door through which external domination re-enters the continent.

13. Model Clauses and Practical Tools

A sovereignty doctrine becomes serious only when it can enter documents. Speeches expose the problem. Declarations frame the struggle. Demands set the political direction. But clauses, protocols, checklists, audit templates, and institutional procedures determine whether

sovereignty survives in practice. The goal is simple: no more beautiful language without enforceable safeguards.

Every major agreement with an external power should begin with a sovereignty preamble: the Parties affirm that cooperation shall be conducted in full respect of the sovereignty, jurisdiction, dignity, territorial integrity, constitutional order, strategic autonomy, and historical memory of the host State. No provision of the agreement shall be interpreted as authorizing foreign control over national security, critical infrastructure, data, natural resources, public institutions, or domestic political processes. Cooperation shall strengthen, not weaken, the host State's autonomous capacity to govern, protect, produce, regulate, and terminate the arrangement when required by national interest.

Foreign partners must not be allowed to appropriate African liberation language for their own branding. A Pan-African concept protection clause should recognize that Pan-Africanism, decolonization, self-determination, African sovereignty, and related concepts arise from the historical struggles of African and African-descended peoples against slavery, colonial domination, racial hierarchy, economic dependency, cultural erasure, and foreign control. No party should use such concepts in a manner that misrepresents their historical meaning, claims external authorship over them, or undermines the sovereignty and agency of African peoples and institutions.

A material reciprocity clause should state that reciprocity under the agreement shall be assessed not merely by textual equivalence, but by material equivalence of access, rights, obligations, enforcement capacity, operational presence, jurisdictional exposure, strategic leverage, and consequences. Where a right granted to one party cannot be realistically exercised by the other under comparable conditions, such right shall be subject to

additional safeguards, parliamentary notification, and periodic review.

A jurisdiction clause for foreign personnel should state that all foreign personnel operating under the agreement, including soldiers, advisers, trainers, contractors, subcontractors, consultants, logistics personnel, and intelligence-linked personnel, remain subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the host State for serious offenses committed on the territory of the host State. Serious offenses include murder, rape, sexual assault, sexual exploitation, abuse of minors, trafficking in persons, drug trafficking, weapons diversion, mineral smuggling, violence against civilians, espionage against the host State, obstruction of justice, and offenses against national security.

An anti-evacuation clause should state that no foreign personnel accused of a serious offense may be removed from the territory of the host State before preliminary investigation by competent host State authorities, unless removal is jointly approved in writing by the host State's judicial authority and subject to enforceable guarantees of continued availability, evidence preservation, victim participation, and prosecution or extradition where appropriate.

A data sovereignty clause should state that data generated, collected, processed, stored, transferred, or analyzed under the agreement remains subject to the laws and sovereign control of the host State. No data concerning citizens, residents, public institutions, critical infrastructure, security systems, health systems, identity systems, natural resources, or strategic sectors should be transferred, monetized, reused, trained into external models, or shared with third parties without explicit authorization, auditability, and enforceable safeguards approved by competent host State authorities.

A practical sovereignty review checklist should ask: does the agreement increase African autonomy; preserve African jurisdiction; protect

victims; avoid blanket immunity; include cargo and contractor audits; protect data sovereignty; protect critical infrastructure; include an exit clause; require parliamentary oversight; prevent elite capture; protect youth from influence pipelines; ensure fair intellectual property rules; respect African historical memory; disclose funding and implementation actors; and create capacity to operate without the foreign partner over time? If several answers are no, the agreement is not mature. It is a risk package.

14. Training Module: Dignity-Based Negotiation and Cognitive Sovereignty

The doctrine must enter training. If it remains in articles, declarations, and model clauses, it will influence debate but not behavior. The real test is whether African diplomats, negotiators, lawyers, civil servants, journalists, military officers, students, and intellectuals can apply it under pressure. They must know how to detect symbolic domination, identify false reciprocity, protect jurisdiction, and respond without panic, servility, or reckless escalation.

The proposed training module is Dignity-Based Negotiation and Cognitive Sovereignty. Its purpose is to train African representatives to cooperate with the world without surrendering meaning, dignity, jurisdiction, or strategic autonomy. The module should produce leaders and professionals who can recognize colonial and neocolonial framing, distinguish partnership from dependency, detect paternalistic language, expose false reciprocity, assess military, legal, digital, financial, and diplomatic risk, protect African concepts from appropriation, respond to symbolic humiliation with disciplined firmness, negotiate clauses that preserve sovereignty, convert public anger into institutional action, and defend African interests without theatrical recklessness.

The training should include ten units: historical memory and the psychology of empire; Colonial Narcissistic Inversion; dignity as a sovereignty

indicator; material reciprocity analysis; jurisdiction, immunity, and victim protection; cognitive-diplomatic warfare; foreign influence and elite capture; strategic communication under pressure; negotiation red lines; and from anger to institution.

Participants should practice analyzing foreign speeches, rewriting weak immunity clauses, responding to pushbacks such as 'you are overreacting' or 'it is reciprocal,' drafting sovereignty risk memos, and delivering public statements that balance anger, clinical precision, and strategic demands. They should pass only if they can define Pan-Africanism without external dependency, identify Colonial Narcissistic Inversion, distinguish textual from material reciprocity, protect African jurisdiction in treaty language, detect paternalistic framing, respond to symbolic insult calmly and firmly, assess foreign access as risk, protect citizens before foreign partners, convert emotion into institutional response, and negotiate without seeking foreign validation.

The correct training posture is to feel the violation, diagnose the structure, protect the law, negotiate the clause, and build the institution. The goal is not hostility toward the world. The goal is sovereign competence: the ability to cooperate with anyone while protecting African meaning, law, dignity, citizens, and strategic autonomy.

15. Research and Evidence Agenda

The doctrine must be supported by evidence. Without evidence, opponents will reduce the argument to anger, ideology, or anti-French sentiment. Evidence does not weaken the moral force. It protects it. It makes the argument harder to dismiss, harder to caricature, and harder to neutralize through diplomatic language.

The central research question is: how do former colonial powers and external strategic actors use diplomatic language, military cooperation, legal

immunity, youth diplomacy, investment, innovation, and partnership frameworks to preserve influence over African sovereignty? This question keeps the work disciplined. It avoids personal obsession with one leader. Macron becomes a case study, not the whole subject.

The main hypothesis is that external powers increasingly preserve influence in Africa through rebranded partnership frameworks that combine symbolic language, elite validation, security cooperation, legal asymmetry, financial access, youth diplomacy, and narrative control. These frameworks often appear reciprocal in wording while remaining asymmetrical in power.

The sub-hypotheses are: external powers soften African sovereignty language by appropriating terms such as partnership, reciprocity, youth, development, stability, security, reform, and Pan-Africanism; foreign agreements often contain formally reciprocal clauses that are materially usable only by the stronger party; military, security, and diplomatic immunity clauses can weaken African jurisdiction and create accountability gaps; youth, innovation, fellowship, leadership, and entrepreneurship programs can function as channels of foreign influence when not governed by African standards; and elites that tolerate symbolic humiliation are more likely to tolerate legal, military, financial, or diplomatic asymmetry.

Evidence should be collected in five categories: speech and discourse evidence; treaty and agreement evidence; incident and abuse evidence; elite reaction evidence; and material power evidence. The research must distinguish allegation, investigation, finding, conviction, and pattern. It should never treat all allegations as proven. It should treat repeated allegations as risk signals requiring safeguards.

Methods should include critical discourse analysis, legal clause analysis, security risk assessment, comparative historical analysis, elite

behavior analysis, and predictive modeling. The research outputs should include a full academic article, a policy brief, a legal toolkit, a training manual, an annual sovereignty audit, and a public explainer series.

The research ethics are essential: distinguish evidence from allegation; separate direct proof, credible allegation, institutional pattern, strategic incentive, and foreseeable risk; criticize systems, policies, and elite behavior, not ordinary populations; avoid racial essentialism; apply the same standard to all external powers; protect victims; use sources responsibly; and preserve strategic precision. Strong language is allowed, but unsupported claims weaken the case.

16. Final Integrated Conclusion: From Nairobi to a New Pan-African Standard

Placed beside the March 2026 UN vote on enslavement and reparatory justice, Nairobi becomes more than a summit incident. It becomes a mirror of the global hierarchy of recognition. Western institutions have shown that they can mobilize severe legal, financial, cultural, and diplomatic pressure when European sovereignty is violated. Yet when African historical devastation, reparatory justice, and the continuing afterlives of racialized extraction are placed on the table, many of the same actors become cautious, technical, and reluctant. That contrast does not invalidate every legal reservation, but it exposes the political fact: African suffering is still asked to wait for recognition, while European insecurity is treated as an emergency.

Placed beside the Sahel and the Kenya-France defence debate, the lesson is equally hard. A foreign state may say it acts for partnership, but African institutions must measure access, jurisdiction, material reciprocity, military presence, intelligence leverage, and exit power. Claims that France has directly supported terrorist actors in Africa require evidence before being stated as legal fact. Yet accusations,

patterns of strategic benefit from insecurity, hostility toward sovereign realignment, and attempts to preserve relevance through security dependency must trigger counterintelligence scrutiny, not polite dismissal. Whether the mechanism is direct support, tolerated proxy dynamics, coercive exploitation of insecurity, or narrative pressure after rejection, the sovereign question remains the same: does the arrangement increase African autonomy, or does it preserve foreign centrality?

The Nairobi moment was not an isolated diplomatic discomfort. It was a revelation. It exposed the old hierarchy wearing modern language. It showed a former colonial power claiming the vocabulary of African liberation. It showed Africa framed through youth in a way that can slide from demographic truth into paternalistic positioning. It showed a foreign president acting with disciplinary ease in an African space. It showed how partnership can operate as a beautiful word covering unresolved questions of history, access, immunity, military presence, influence, and jurisdiction. Above all, it exposed the weakness of African elites who too often treat symbolic humiliation as the price of diplomatic respectability.

Macron is therefore not an anomaly. He is an unusually visible expression of a wider Western imperial pathology: the captor returns as liberator, the exploiter returns as partner, the destabilizer returns as security adviser, and the colonial actor returns as Pan-Africanist. This is Western Imperial Inversion, and it belongs to the Crying Demon Syndrome: the predator that wounds, then weeps; dominates, then lectures; extracts, then offers partnership; destabilizes, then sells security; enslaves, then celebrates abolition as self-praise. The facts require clinical precision, and the moral pattern deserves contempt. A continent that keeps applauding its narrators while they redesign dependency has not matured. It has merely learned to perfume subordination.

The central concept is clear: Colonial Narcissistic Inversion. It occurs when a former or continuing colonial power recasts itself as the authentic representative, guardian, or moral author of the liberation tradition created against its own domination. It is not ordinary arrogance. It is the theft of moral position. It is the colonizer stepping into the language of liberation and speaking as if the struggle were his to define.

Macron's claim that France is the true Pan-Africanist belongs to that structure. Pan-Africanism was not born in French diplomacy. It was born from the struggle against enslavement, colonial conquest, racial hierarchy, territorial fragmentation, foreign domination, resource extraction, cultural humiliation, and postcolonial dependency. It is the doctrine of African and African-descended self-determination. It cannot be authored by a state historically tied to the systems it was created to resist.

The final message to France is clear: partnership remains possible, but hierarchy must end. France can cooperate with Africa only as a partner subject to African-defined terms, African law, African memory, African priorities, and African dignity. France must not claim authorship over Pan-Africanism. It must accept that Pan-Africanism requires the dismantling of the very structures that made French centrality possible.

The final message to African leaders is harsher: if you cannot defend dignity, leave power alone. If you cannot say no, do not negotiate. If you cannot detect false reciprocity, do not sign. If you need foreign applause to feel legitimate, you are unfit for sovereign responsibility. If you are aggressive with your own people and submissive before external power, you are not mature. You are a liability.

The final message to African intellectuals is a duty: stop decorating weakness. Stop sterilizing justified anger. Stop making domination sound

complex when the structure is clear. Your task is to sharpen African perception, not dull it. Your task is to connect history to law, emotion to doctrine, doctrine to tools, and tools to institutions.

Nairobi should not be remembered only as a moment of arrogance. It should be remembered as the moment that forced a new African standard: Africa can cooperate with the world, but it will not be narrated by the world; Africa can receive partners, but it will govern the room; Africa can accept investment, but it will not sell jurisdiction; Africa can train youth, but not as raw material for foreign influence; Africa can sign agreements, but not with false reciprocity; Africa can be courteous, but never servile; Africa can be open, but never naive.

The closing doctrine is final: outrage must become doctrine; doctrine must become clauses; clauses must become institutions; institutions must become power. Anything less is another performance of African weakness before foreign arrogance.

Operational Doctrine at a Glance

Doctrine	Meaning	Institutional consequence
No dignity, no mandate	Dignity is the lowest-cost test of sovereignty.	Leaders who tolerate public humiliation lose moral authority.
No courage, no negotiation authority	Technical competence without courage can administer dependency.	Strategic negotiators must be screened for sovereignty instinct.
No foreign actor above African law	Partnership cannot override jurisdiction.	Reject blanket military immunity and require victim safeguards.

No reciprocity without material symmetry	Equal wording is not equal power.	Audit every agreement for real presence, access, leverage, and enforcement.
No Pan-Africanism without African autonomy	Pan-Africanism is not a summit brand.	Reject external ownership of African liberation language.
No false diplomacy	Diplomacy cannot protect foreign arrogance while disciplining African anger.	Evaluate diplomats and intellectuals on their ability to set boundaries.
No immunity without accountability	Legal protection must follow enforceable safeguards.	Require jurisdiction, investigation, victim protection, and parliamentary oversight.
No youth framing without civilizational respect	Africa has a young population; it is not a child civilization.	Reject language that converts demographic youth into paternalistic hierarchy.
No partnership without exit power	A partnership that cannot be terminated without damage is dependency.	Build termination clauses, local capacity, and transition plans into every agreement.

References

- [1] Elysee. (2026). Africa Forward: Africa-France Partnerships for Innovation and Growth Summit. Official announcement, 6 May 2026. <https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2026/05/06/africa-forward-africa-france-partnerships-for-innovation-and-growth-summit>
- [2] Africa Forward Summit. (2026). Official summit website. <https://africaforwardsummit.go.ke/>
- [3] Reuters. (2026). African leaders push for risk pricing rethink, fresh investment at France Africa summit. 11 May 2026. <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/african-leaders-push-risk-pricing-rethink-fresh-investment-france-africa-summit-2026-05-11/>
- [4] Associated Press. (2026). France woos Anglophone Africa at a summit in Kenya. 11 May 2026. <https://apnews.com/article/372d14a4e5f52be3e23640772a22b8ab>
- [5] Le Monde. (2026). After a decade of crises between France and its former colonies, Macron chooses Kenya for the last major African trip of his presidency. 11 May 2026. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/05/11/in-nairobi-macron-ends-a-decade-of-turmoil-in-france-africa-relations_6753333_4.html
- [6] Le Monde. (2026). Africa-France summit: Emmanuel Macron halts speech to call for silence. 11 May 2026. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/video/2026/05/11/africa-france-summit-macron-interrupts-speech-to-call-for-silence_6753342_4.html
- [7] People. (2026). French President Emmanuel Macron grabs microphone, interrupts event to scold the audience for being rude. 11 May 2026. <https://people.com/emmanuel-macron-interrupts-event-scold-audience-11971819>

- [8] Du Bois, W. E. B. (1947). *The World and Africa*. International Publishers.
- [9] Nkrumah, K. (1963). *Africa Must Unite*. Heinemann.
- [10] Nkrumah, K. (1965). *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*. Thomas Nelson.
- [11] Padmore, G. (1956). *Pan-Africanism or Communism?* Dennis Dobson.
- [12] James, C. L. R. (1938). *The Black Jacobins*. Secker & Warburg.
- [13] Fanon, F. (1961). *The Wretched of the Earth*. Francois Maspero.
- [14] Fanon, F. (1952). *Black Skin, White Masks*. Editions du Seuil.
- [15] Cabral, A. (1973). *Return to the Source: Selected Speeches*. Monthly Review Press.
- [16] Rodney, W. (1972). *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications.
- [17] Cesaire, A. (1950). *Discourse on Colonialism*. Presence Africaine.
- [18] Verschave, F.-X. (1998). *La Françafrique: Le plus long scandale de la République*. Stock.
- [19] Mbembe, A. (2001). *On the Postcolony*. University of California Press.
- [20] Bayart, J.-F. (2000). Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion. *African Affairs*, 99(395), 217-267.
- [21] Cooper, F. (2002). *Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present*. Cambridge University Press.
- [22] Shepard, T. (2006). *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France*. Cornell University Press.
- [23] United Nations. (2015). *Taking Action on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers: Report of an Independent Review on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by International Peacekeeping Forces in the Central African Republic*.
- [24] Human Rights Watch. (Various years). Reports on civilian harm, accountability, and abuses involving security forces and military operations.
- [25] International Crisis Group. (Various years). Reports on foreign military presence, counterterrorism, and African security.
- [26] African Union. (2022). *Data Policy Framework*. African Union Commission.
- [27] Couldry, N., & Mejias, U. A. (2019). *The Costs of Connection: How Data Is Colonizing Human Life and Appropriating It for Capitalism*. Stanford University Press.
- [28] Zuboff, S. (2019). *The Age of Surveillance Capitalism*. PublicAffairs.
- [29] Mamdani, M. (1996). *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*. Princeton University Press.
- [30] Davidson, B. (1992). *The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State*. Times Books.
- [31] Memmi, A. (1957). *The Colonizer and the Colonized*. Editions Buchet/Chastel.
- [32] Said, E. W. (1978). *Orientalism*. Pantheon.
- [33] Ngugi wa Thiong'o. (1986). *Decolonising the Mind*. James Currey.
- [34] Bourdieu, P. (1991). *Language and Symbolic Power*. Harvard University Press.
- [35] Fairclough, N. (1995). *Critical Discourse Analysis*. Longman.
- [36] van Dijk, T. A. (2008). *Discourse and Power*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- [37] Tuhiwai Smith, L. (1999). *Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples*. Zed Books.
- [38] Nsiangani, K. (2014). *The Dark Tetrad Traits of Empire*. Université Simon Kimbangu University Press.

- [39] Nsiangani, K. (2010). Pan-Africanism Reimagined. Katiopia Editions.
- [40] Nsiangani, K. (2016). From Mvemba Nzinga to Modern Puppets. Université Simon Kimbangu University Press.
- [41] Nsiangani, K. (2025). The Colonized Mind: A Clinical Framework. Université Simon Kimbangu University Press.
- [42] United Nations Digital Library. (2026). Declaration of the Trafficking of Enslaved Africans and Racialized Chattel Enslavement of Africans as the Gravest Crime against Humanity: Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, A/80/L.48, 25 March 2026. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4106660>
- [43] Egbejule, E. (2026). UN votes to describe slave trade as 'gravest crime against humanity'. The Guardian, 25 March 2026. <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2026/mar/25/un-votes-slave-trade-gravest-crime-against-humanity-reparatory-justice>
- [44] European Union External Action Service. (2026). EU Explanation of Vote - UN General Assembly: Action on A/80/L.48. 25 March 2026. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-explanation-vote-%E2%80%93-un-general-assembly-action-a80l48-declaration-trafficking-enslaved-africans_en
- [45] United Kingdom Government. (2026). UK Explanation of Vote on the Declaration of the trafficking of enslaved Africans and racialised chattel enslavement of Africans as the gravest Crime Against Humanity. 25 March 2026. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-explanation-of-vote-on-the-declaration-of-the-trafficking-of-enslaved-africans-and-racialised-chattel-enslavement-of-africans-as-the-gravest-crime>
- [46] Al Jazeera. (2026). Risks and rewards in France-Kenya partnership. 11 May 2026. <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/5/11/risks-and-rewards-in-france-kenya-partnership>
- [47] Council of the European Union. (2026). Russia's war against Ukraine: EU sanctions. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia/>
- [48] Reuters. (2026). Stung by West Africa rejections, France courts rest of continent at Kenya summit. 8 May 2026. <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/stung-by-west-africa-rejections-france-courts-rest-continent-kenya-summit-2026-05-08/>
- [49] Reuters. (2025). Kenyan lawmakers identify disturbing trend of misconduct by British troops. 3 December 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/kenyan-lawmakers-identify-disturbing-trend-misconduct-by-british-troops-2025-12-03/>
- [50] Bibliotheque nationale de France. (n.d.). The 1802 Expedition to Saint-Domingue (Haiti) and the Louisiana Purchase. France-Ameriques. <https://heritage.bnf.fr/france-ameriques/en/1802-expedition-saint-domingue-haiti-and-louisiana-purchase>
- [51] Bibliotheque nationale de France. (n.d.). L'expédition de Saint-Domingue de 1802 et la vente de la Louisiane. France-Ameriques. <https://heritage.bnf.fr/france-ameriques/lexpedition-saint-domingue-1802-et-vente-louisiane>
- [52] Bibliotheque nationale de France. (n.d.). Haiti's independence debt: The slave as a unit of account, 1794-1922. France-Ameriques. <https://heritage.bnf.fr/france-ameriques/en/haitis-independence-debt-slave-unit-account-1794-1922>
- [53] Associated Press. (2025). France's president says that making Haiti pay for its independence was unjust. <https://apnews.com/article/339df651093e932d42d607fd3f08025f>
- [54] Bank of England. (2022). The collection of slavery compensation, 1835-43. Staff Working

Paper No. 999.
<https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/working-paper/2022/the-collection-of-slavery-compensation-1835-43>

[55] University College London. (n.d.). Legacies of British Slavery. Made at UCL. <https://www.ucl.ac.uk/made-at-ucl/stories/legacies-british-slavery>

[56] U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian. (n.d.). Note on U.S. Covert Actions; NSC 10/2, 18 June 1948. Foreign Relations of the United States. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/actionsstatement>

[57] Associated Press. (2023). CIA publicly acknowledges 1953 coup it backed in Iran was undemocratic as it revisits 'Argo' rescue. <https://apnews.com/article/218323db3cc1aca6bde1e54827527e8d>

[58] U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. (1992/2008). Defense Planning Guidance, FY 1994-1999, declassified ISCAP documents. <https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/isicap/pdf/2008-003-doc18.pdf>

[59] Le Monde. (2023). The repeated farewells of French presidents to 'Francafrique'. 13 March 2023. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/m-le-mag/article/2023/03/13/the-repeated-farewells-of-french-presidents-to-francafrique_6019213_117.html

[60] Elysee. (2017). Emmanuel Macron's speech at the University of Ouagadougou. 28 November 2017. <https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2017/11/28/emmanuel-macrons-speech-at-the-university-of-ouagadougou>

[61] Nsiangani, K. (2026). The Crying Demon Syndrome: Weaponized Fragility, Responsibility Inversion, and a Public Health Framework Across Family, Institutional, Political, and International Scales. Université Simon Kimbangu / MEN-D.