From Fracture to Capture final

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This article argues that many contemporary African crises should not be read as isolated failures of governance, ethnicity, migration management, or peacebuilding. They are better understood as recurrent expressions of a broader anti-sovereignty mechanism in which colonial injury is softened or selectively remembered, legitimate grievance is redirected inward, local relay actors police acceptable diagnosis, and external powers or aligned interests regain leverage over fractured political space. The article develops a mid-range mechanism theory called the Fracture-Buffer-Capture model and applies it through a comparative historical analysis of South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo. South Africa is treated as a paradigmatic case of redirected grievance under conditions of selective reconciliation, durable inequality, and recurring xenophobic mobilization. The DRC is treated as a paradigmatic case of capture under conditions of proxy war, strategic mineral competition, peace-coded political discipline, and civic narrowing. The core claim is not that every conflict is centrally engineered by the same hands. It is that similar actor-types, discursive moves, incentive structures, and political outcomes recur often enough to justify a unified framework and a continental anti-capture response. The article adopts an assume-compromise, zero-trust perspective: hostile shaping, fragmentation, and strategic interference are treated as standing risk conditions to be assessed through motive, capability, precedent, synchronized indicators, and patterned benefit rather than through self-reporting by the actors involved. The article concludes that Africa requires a Pan-African anti-capture architecture able to defend historical clarity, detect redirected grievance, map buffer actors, correlate conflict with extractive and diplomatic pressures, and train public pattern recognition before crisis hardens into governable fracture. [1-4]

A superficial reading would interpret the assume-compromise posture as making external parties the architects of every situation described here. This reading is inaccurate: a hostile party does not need to initiate every single disruption. It suffices that they engineer and sustain a system that will be more likely to promote capture and manageable chaos where opportunistic intervention and targeted incitement are less costly for the hostile party and locally aligned interest groups than successful redress by the target society.